

TRANSLATION OF OCKHAM'S SUMMA LOGICAE I, CH. 11

Summa Logicae,
Pars I: De Terminis

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Sum of Logic,
Part 1: On Terms

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<Cap. 11: De divisione nominum significantium ad placitum>

<Chapter 11: On the division of names signifying *ad placitum*>

Positis divisionibus quae possunt competere tam terminis naturaliter significantibus quam etiam terminis ad placitum institutis, dicendum est de quibusdam divisionibus competentibus terminis ad placitum institutis

Having set out those divisions which pertain as much to terms which signify naturally as those which are instituted *ad placitum*, we need to speak about those divisions which only pertain to terms instituted *ad placitum*.

Est autem prima divisio talis: nominum ad placitum significantium quaedam sunt nomina primae impositionis et quaedam sunt nomina secundae impositionis. Nomina secundae impositionis sunt nomina imposita ad significandum signa ad placitum instituta et illa quae consequuntur talia signa, sed nonnisi dum sunt signa.

The first division of that sort is this: of the names signify *ad placitum*, some are names of first imposition and some are names of second imposition. Names of second imposition are names made to signify signs instituted *ad placitum*, as well as those which follow from such signs insofar as they are signs.

Verumtamen hoc commune nomen secundae impositionis, potest dupliciter accipi. Scilicet large, et tunc omne illud est nomen secundae impositionis quod significat voces ad placitum institutas, sed nonnisi quando sunt ad placitum institutae, sive illud nomen sit commune etiam intentionibus animae quae sunt signa naturalia sive non. Talia autem nomina sunt huiusmodi

However, this general name, 'second imposition', can be understood in two ways. In a broad sense, everything is a name of second imposition which signifies utterances instituted *ad placitum* (but only when they are instituted *ad placitum*), whether or not that name is also common also to intentions of the mind. Such names are of this sort: 'noun',

'nomen', 'pronomen', 'coniunctio', 'verbum', 'casus', 'numerus', 'modus', 'tempus' et huiusmodi, accipiendo ista vocabula illo modo quo utitur eis grammaticus. Et vocantur ista nomina 'nomina nominum', quia non imponuntur nisi ad significandum partes orationis, et hoc non nisi dum istae partes sunt significativae. Illa enim nomina quae praedicantur de vocibus ita quando non sunt significativae sicut quando sunt significativae, non vocantur nomina secundae impositionis. Et ideo talia nomina 'qualitas', 'prolatum', 'vox' et huiusmodi, quamvis significant voces ad placitum institutas et verificentur de eis, quia tamen ita significarent eas si non essent significativae sicut nunc, ideo non sunt nomina secundae impositionis. Sed 'nomen' est nomen secundae impositionis, quia ista vox 'homo', nec aliqua alia, antequam imponebatur ad significandum non erat nomen, et similiter 'hominis' antequam imponebatur ad significandum nullius casus erat, et ita est de aliis.

Stricte autem dicitur nomen secundae impositionis, illud quod non significat nisi signa ad placitum instituta, ita quod non potest competere intentionibus animae quae sunt naturalia signa, cuiusmodi sunt talia 'figura', 'coniugatio' et huiusmodi.

Omnia autem alia nomina ab istis, quae scilicet non sunt nomina secundae impositionis nec uno modo nec alio, vocantur nomina primae impositionis.

'pronoun', 'conjunction', 'verb', 'case', 'number', 'mode', 'time', and terms of that sort, taking those word in the way in which a grammarian uses them. And those names are called 'names of names', because they are not made for nothing expect for signifying parts of speech insofar as those parts as significative. For those names which are predicated of utterances in the same way when they are not significative as when they are significative are not called names of second imposition. And therefore names such as 'quality', 'utterance', 'spoken noise' and others of that sort, although they signify utterances instituted *ad placitum* and are truly predicated of them, are not names of second imposition, because they would signify them even if the things that they signify were not significative. But 'name' is a name of second imposition, because that utterance, 'human', was not some other name before it was made to signify [humans], and likewise 'of a human' did not have a case before it was made to signify, and likewise for all the other examples.

In a narrow sense, a name of second imposition is said to be that which does not signify anything except signs instituted *ad placitum*, so that it cannot pertain to intentions of the soul, which are natural signs. Terms of this sort include 'figure', 'conjunction', and like expressions.

All other names besides those, namely, which are not names of second imposition either broadly or narrowly speaking, are called names of first imposition.

Verumtamen nomen primae impositionis dupliciter accipi potest, scilicet large, et sic omnia nomina quae non sunt nomina secundae impositionis sunt nomina primae impositionis. Et sic talia signa syncategorematica 'omnis', 'nullus', 'aliquis', 'quilibet' et huiusmodi sunt nomina primae impositionis. Aliter potest accipi stricte, et tunc sola nomina categorematica, quae non sunt nomina secundae impositionis, vocantur nomina primae impositionis, et non nomina syncategorematica.

Nomina autem primae impositionis, stricte accipiendo nomen primae impositionis, sunt in duplici differentia, quia quaedam sunt nomina primae intentionis et quaedam sunt nomina secundae intentionis. Nomina secundae intentionis vocantur illa nomina quae praecise imposita sunt ad significandum intentiones animae, vel praecise intentiones animae quae sunt signa naturalia, et alia signa ad placitum instituta vel consequentia talia signa. Et talia nomina sunt omnia talia 'genus', 'species', 'universale', 'praedicabile' et huiusmodi, quia talia nomina non significant nisi intentiones animae quae sunt signa naturalia vel signa voluntarie instituta.

Unde potest dici quod hoc commune nomen secundae intentionis potest accipi stricte et large. Large illud dicitur nomen secundae intentionis quod significat intentiones animae quae sunt naturalia signa, sive etiam significet signa ad placitum instituta tantum dum sunt signa sive non. Et sic aliquod nomen secundae intentionis et primae impositionis est etiam nomen secundae impositionis. Stricte autem illud solum dicitur nomen secundae intentionis quod praecise significat intentiones animae quae sunt naturalia signa; et

However, 'name of second imposition' can be understood in two ways, namely, in a broad sense, and in this sense all names which are not names of second imposition are names of first imposition. And in this sense syncategorematic signs such as 'every', 'none', 'some', 'each', and signs of this sort are names of first imposition. Alternatively, in a narrow sense, only categorematic names that are not names of second imposition, and not syncategorematic names, are called names of first imposition.

However names of first imposition, in the narrow sense, are distinguished into two kinds, because some are names of first intention and some are names of second intention. Names of second intention are those names which are made precisely to signify intentions of the soul, or precisely intentions of the soul which are natural signs, as well as some signs instituted ad placitum or features following from such signs. And such names are all the following: 'genus', 'species', 'universal', 'predicable' and other similar names, because such names do not signify anything except intentions of the soul which are natural signs, or signs instituted voluntarily.

Hence it can be said that this general term, 'name of second intention', can be interpreted narrowly or broadly. Broadly speaking, that is called a name of second intention that signifies intentions of the soul which are natural signs, regardless of whether it signifies signs instituted *ad placitum*. And in this way some name of second intention and first imposition is also a name of second imposition. Speaking in a narrow sense, however, that alone is called a name of second intention that precisely signifies intentions of the soul

sic accipiendo nullum nomen secundae intentionis est nomen secundae impositionis.

Nomina autem primae intentionis vocantur omnia alia nomina a praedictis, quae videlicet significant aliquas res quae non sunt signa, nec consequentia talia signa, cuiusmodi sunt omnia talia 'homo', 'animal', 'Sortes', 'Plato', 'albedo', 'album', 'ens', 'verum', 'bonum' et huiusmodi, quorum aliqua significant praecise res quae non sunt signa nata supponere pro aliis, aliqua significant talia signa et simul cum hoc alias res.

Ex quibus omnibus colligi potest quod quaedam nomina significant praecise signa ad placitum instituta, et nonnisi dum sunt signa, quaedam autem praecise significant signa tam ad placitum instituta quam signa naturalia. Quaedam vero significant praecise res quae non sunt signa talia, quae sunt partes propositionis; quaedam indifferenter significant tales res quae non sunt partes propositionis nec orationis et etiam signa talia, cuiusmodi sunt talia nomina 'res', 'ens', 'aliquid' et huiusmodi.

which are natural signs; and, when taking the expression in this way, no name of second intention is a name of second imposition.

However, all those names which differ from the kind already mentioned are called names of first intention. Those names signify some things which are not signs, nor are features which accompany those signs. All the following are of that sort: 'human', 'animal', 'Socrates', 'Plato', 'whiteness', 'something white', 'being', 'something true', 'something good', and so on for similar expressions, of which some signify precisely a thing which is not a sign suited to supposit for others, and others signify signs of this sort and at the same time with this other things.

From all of these considerations, one can gather that certain names exclusively signify signs instituted conventionally, and do not signify them except because they are signs, yet others exclusively signify natural signs as well as signs instituted conventionally. Moreover, some exclusively signify things which are not signs of the sort which are parts of a proposition; others signify indifferently things of the sort which are not parts of a proposition or of an *oratio* and also signs of this sort, of which sort are names such as 'thing', 'being', 'something', and so on.