

TRANSCRIPTION AND TRANSLATION OF  
BURLEY'S LATE COMMENTARY ON THE *CATEGORIES* (SELECTIONS)<sup>1</sup>

Expositio super Librum *Praedicamentorum*,  
Prologus et Capitulum 12

Gualterus Burlaeus

Ex 'Super Artem Veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis',  
Venedig, 1497

<Prologus>

An Explanation of the *Categories*,  
Prologue and Chapter 12

Walter Burley

From 'Concerning the Old Logic of Aristotle and  
Porphyry', Venice, 1497

<Prologue>

— Incipit liber praedicamentorum

Circa librum praedicamentorum <Aristotelis><sup>2</sup> est sciendum  
quod subiectum contentivum totius scientiae traditae in libro  
{praedicamenti}<sup>3</sup> est ens dicibile incomplexum, ordinabile in

Here begins the *Categories*.

We need to know that the subject matter of the science  
provided in this book, the *Categories*, is non-complex,  
expressible being, capable of being ordered in kind, by

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<sup>1</sup> The base text for this appendix is the 1497 Venice edition of Burley's late commentary on the old logic (i.e., the *Super Artem Veterem*). However, I also include disagreements in the sections I have translated between that text and two earlier manuscripts: Magdalen 146 ('A'), written during the late fourteenth or early fifteenth century, and Canon Misc 460 ('B'), written during the fifteenth century. I indicate that one or more manuscripts omit a section of the text found in the 1497 edition with square brackets ([ ]), where anything within the brackets is found in the 1497 edition but is not found in the relevant manuscript(s). Occasionally, one manuscript will omit a word or phrase, while the other includes a variant. In that case, I include the variant in the footnote, indicating which manuscript contains the variant and which manuscript contains the omission. I indicate that one or more of the manuscripts includes text not found in the 1497 edition with corner brackets (<>), including within those brackets the text found in the relevant manuscript(s). When an omission is not at issue, I indicate a variation between one or more manuscripts and the 1497 edition with brace brackets ({}), placing the manuscript variant(s) in a footnote. I ignore mere differences in word order (e.g. 'subiectum et praedicatum' vs. 'praedicatum et subiectum') among the texts.

<sup>2</sup> B

<sup>3</sup> 'praedicamentorum': B

genere, intelligendo pro genus coordinationem praedicamentalem. Omne {nam}<sup>4</sup> de quo per se determinatur in hoc libro est ens dicibile incomplexum ordinabile in coordinationem seu in linea praedicamentali. Et ita hoc commune ens dicibile est {praedicabile}<sup>5</sup> de omnibus de quibus [hic]<sup>6</sup> per se {determinatur}<sup>7</sup> in hoc libro. <Multa tamen sunt particula subiecta de quibus {probatur}<sup>8</sup> passiones et proprietates in hoc libro.><sup>9</sup> Utrum autem hic determinetur de rebus {an}<sup>10</sup> de vocibus sunt opiniones. Boethius et Simplicius videntur dicere quod in hoc libro principaliter determinatur de vocibus. Dicit enim Boethius quod in hoc {libro}<sup>11</sup> intentio philosophi est primis rerum nominibus et de vocibus significantibus res disputare. Et Simplicius dicit quod intentio in hoc {negocio}<sup>12</sup> est de simplicibus et primis et generalibus vocibus secundum quod sunt significativae [rerum]<sup>13</sup> determinare. Et si quis {vellet}<sup>14</sup> istam opinionem sustinere habet dicere quod hic determinatur de vocibus <de quibus><sup>15</sup> et in grammatica similiter <determinatur de vocibus><sup>16</sup>, sed aliter

understanding for ‘kind’ categorical coordination. For everything about which *per se* is described in this book is a non-complex, expressible being, capable of being ordered in coordination or in a categorical line. And so ‘common being capable of being expressed’ can be predicated of everything about which *per se* is described in this book. But there are many particular subjects of which the properties and attributes described in this book are predicated. Opinions differ, moreover, on whether those subjects are things or utterances. Boethius and Simplicius seem to say that this book is principally about utterances. For Boethius says that Aristotle intends to have a discussion about the primary names of things and about utterances signifying things in this book. And Simplicius says that the purpose of this work is to describe simple and primary and general utterances that signify things. And if someone wants to maintain that opinion, he has to say that this work discusses utterances and grammar does as well,

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<sup>4</sup> ‘enim’: B

<sup>5</sup> ‘commune’: A, B

<sup>6</sup> A

<sup>7</sup> ‘consistatur’: A

<sup>8</sup> ‘praedicantur’: A

<sup>9</sup> A, B

<sup>10</sup> ‘aut’: A

<sup>11</sup> ‘opere’: A, B

<sup>12</sup> ‘libro’: B

<sup>13</sup> A

<sup>14</sup> ‘velit’: A, B

<sup>15</sup> A

<sup>16</sup> A

et aliter <quam in grammatica><sup>17</sup>, quia in grammatica determinatur de vocibus quantum ad proprietates {causantes}<sup>18</sup> congruitatem {vel}<sup>19</sup> incongruitatem in oratione, ostendendo quae vox est nomen [et]<sup>20</sup> quae verbum [et cuius generis et]<sup>21</sup> cuius casus <cuius modi, cuius numerii><sup>22</sup>, et sic de aliis proprietatibus {causantibus}<sup>23</sup> congruitatem {et}<sup>24</sup> incongruitatem in oratione. Sed in hoc libro <praedicamentorum><sup>25</sup> principaliter determinatur de vocibus secundum quod sunt significativae rerum. [Et]<sup>26</sup> ideo in hoc libro determinatur tam de rebus quam de vocibus, principaliter tamen de vocibus. <Et><sup>27</sup> Haec est intentio Boethii et Simplicii, et {multorum aliorum}<sup>28</sup>.

Alia est opinio Avicennae et Averroii, quam credo veriore, quod in libro principaliter determinatur de rebus principaliter, et ex consequenti et secun<c3vb>dario de vocibus. Dicit enim Avicenna, in prima parte suae logicae sic **ad considerationem dictionum duxit nos necessitas**. Logicus {tantum ut logicus}<sup>29</sup> non habet <primo><sup>30</sup> occupari circa verba nisi

but one is concerned with utterances in one way and the other in another way. For grammar is concerned with utterances in regards to the properties causing congruity and incongruity in a sentence, by pointing out which utterance is a noun and which a verb, and of what kind and case it is, and so on for the other properties which cause congruity and incongruity in a sentence. But the science of this work is concerned with utterances principally insofar as they signify things. And therefore this work deals as much with things as it does with utterances, though it principally deals with utterances. This is the interpretation of Boethius and of Simplicius and of many others.

Avicenna and Averroes offer a different opinion (an opinion which I believe is more correct) that this book principally deals with things, and that it deals with utterances only as a consequence and in a secondary manner. For Avicenna says, in the first part of his logic, that **necessity leads us to consider the expression**. Logic,

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<sup>17</sup> B

<sup>18</sup> ‘constituentes’: B

<sup>19</sup> ‘et’: A, B

<sup>20</sup> B

<sup>21</sup> B

<sup>22</sup> B

<sup>23</sup> ‘considerantibus’: B

<sup>24</sup> ‘vel’: A

<sup>25</sup> A, B

<sup>26</sup> B

<sup>27</sup> A, B

<sup>28</sup> ‘multorum’: A; ‘aliorum multorum’: B

<sup>29</sup> ‘in hoc, quod est logicus’: A, B

quantum ad loquendum et discernendum [verum ab falso]<sup>31</sup>. Si enim esset possibile {solo}<sup>32</sup> <per><sup>33</sup> intellectu {dicere}<sup>34</sup>, non indigeremus verbis. Si enim doctor artis posset [illud]<sup>35</sup> revelare <id><sup>36</sup> quod est in anima {sua}<sup>37</sup> alio modo quam loquendo <per voces><sup>38</sup>, semper supersederet ab verbis. Unde si logica posset doceri alio modo quam per vocibus, ut puta per {signa digitorum vel per nutum oculorum}<sup>39</sup>, logicus non indigeret vocibus. Quod autem {logicus}<sup>40</sup> considerat de vocibus, hoc non est ex primaria intentione, sed secundaria et ex consequenti, {secundum scientia logicalis non aliter commode doceri potest}<sup>41</sup>. Unde si {aliquis}<sup>42</sup> surdus ab nativitate posset invenire artem syllogizandi et demonstrandi, tunc posset {logicam sine cogitatione vocum habere}<sup>43</sup>. Sed hoc forte est possibile, scilicet quod [surdus ab nativitate habens alios sensus possit invenire artem logicae, quia]<sup>44</sup> surdus ab nativitate habens alios sensus perfectos potest habere aliquos conceptus ordinatos et ita potest discurrere ab

insofar as it is logic, does not have to be concerned with words, except to the extent that it needs to be concerned with speaking and with distinguishing the true from the false. For if it were possible for the intellect to speak by itself, we would have no need for words. For if a teacher of an art were able to reveal that which is in his soul in way other than by speaking, he would always refrain from words. Therefore if logic could be taught in another way than through utterances (as for example through sign language or through blinking one's eyes), logic would have no need for utterances. That the logician considers utterances, then, is not on account of a primary concern in logic, but due to a secondary and consequential one, because logic is not able to be taught conveniently in another way. Hence, if someone deaf from birth were able to discover the art of syllogizing and demonstrating, then he would have logic without the cognition of an utterance.

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<sup>30</sup> B

<sup>31</sup> A, B

<sup>32</sup> 'solus': B

<sup>33</sup> B

<sup>34</sup> 'discere': A

<sup>35</sup> B

<sup>36</sup> B

<sup>37</sup> 'eius': A, B

<sup>38</sup> A

<sup>39</sup> 'signum vel nudus digitorum': A, B

<sup>40</sup> 'logica': B

<sup>41</sup> 'quia scilicet logica aliter commode non doceretur': A, B

<sup>42</sup> 'quis': B

<sup>43</sup> 'habet logicam sine cogitatione vocum': A, B

<sup>44</sup> A, B

premissis notis ad conclusionem, et invenire quod in tali discursum {non sit error}<sup>45</sup>, et per consequens potest habere logicam per inventionem, et per consequens logica non est principaliter de vocibus, quia <a vocibus><sup>46</sup> tunc posset aliquis habere scientiam aliquam <et><sup>47</sup> ignorare scibile de quo est scientia illa, quod est <valde><sup>48</sup> absurdum.

Et {hic}<sup>49</sup> est opinio Averroii, qui, in dividendo capitula huius libri, dicit quod philosophus in primo capitulo <huius libri><sup>50</sup> narrat quasdam {distinctiones}<sup>51</sup> entium secundum quod significantur per dictiones, et ita vult quod iste liber principaliter sit de entibus, distinguendo ens contra vocem. Istud videtur concordari processui philosophi {qui philosophus determinat in hoc libro de proprietatibus et passionibus rerum}<sup>52</sup>, ut de proprietatibus substantiae et qualitatis et quantitatis. Nunc autem scientia videtur esse de istis esse principaliter de quorum proprietatibus et passionibus principaliter determinatur in illa. Sed in hoc libro non

But this perhaps is possible, namely that a person deaf from birth can discover the art of logic, because a person deaf from birth who has other senses which work perfectly well can have some ordered concepts, and so can reason discursively from known premises to a conclusion, and he can discover that in such discursive reasoning there is no error, and consequently he can have logic through discovery. Consequently logic is not principally about utterances, because then someone could have some knowledge while being ignorant of what that knowledge is about, which is absurd.

This is also the opinion of Averroes, who, in dividing up the chapters of this book, says that Aristotle, in the first chapter of this book, discusses certain definitions of being according to which they are signified through expressions, and so he claims that this book is principally concerned with beings, by distinguishing a being from an utterance. That clearly agrees with the plan of Aristotle, who describes in this book the properties and attributes of things – for example, the properties of substance, of quality, and of quantity. But now clearly a science is first and foremost about those things which possess the properties and

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<sup>45</sup> ‘non est error’: A; ‘error non esset’: B

<sup>46</sup> B

<sup>47</sup> A

<sup>48</sup> A, B

<sup>49</sup> ‘haec’: B

<sup>50</sup> A, B

<sup>51</sup> ‘diffinitiones’: A, B

<sup>52</sup> ‘in hoc libri, quia philosophus non determinat de proprietatibus et passionibus vocum, sed rerum’: B

determinatur de proprietatibus <et passionibus><sup>53</sup> vocum sed rerum. Ergo, et cetera.

Item iste liber principaliter est de [decem]<sup>54</sup> praedicamentis. Ergo si iste liber principaliter esset de vocibus, sequeretur quod decem praedicamenta essent [decem]<sup>55</sup> voces. Sed omnis vox est in genere qualitatis. [Ergo omnia decem praedicamenta sunt in genere qualitatis,]<sup>56</sup> et sic non esset nisi unum genus generalissimum, scilicet qualitas. Dico ergo quod liber praedicamentorum est de rebus secundum quod eis insunt intentiones secundae, scilicet intentio generis generalissimi, et [generis]<sup>57</sup> subalterni, et intentio speciei <specialissime><sup>58</sup>, et sic de aliis.

Sed dubium est [hic]<sup>59</sup>, quia videtur quod in libro praedicamentorum determinatur principaliter de partibus enunciationis de quibus determinatur in libro perihermeneias. Sed partes enunciationis non sunt res, sed voces vel conceptus. [Ergo et cetera.]<sup>60</sup> Si {nam}<sup>61</sup> enunciatio vel propositio componeretur ex rebus, sequeretur quod inter subiectum et

attributes principally described in that science. But in this book the properties described are not those of utterances but of things. Therefore, etc.

Similarly, this book is principally about the ten categories. Therefore, if this book were principally about utterances, it would follow that the ten categories would be ten utterances. But every utterance is in the genus of quality. Therefore, all the ten categories are in the genus of quality, and so there would be only one most general genus, namely quality. Therefore, I say that the *Categories* is about things according to which second intentions are in them, namely the intention of a most general genus, and the intention of a subalternate genus, and an intention of a most specific species, and so on for the rest.

But there is a doubt here, because it seems that in the *Categories* the parts of a statement are principally described, which parts the *Perihermeneias* treats *qua* parts of a statement. But the parts of a statement are not things, but utterances or concepts. For if a statement were composed of things, it would follow that a bird could fly

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<sup>53</sup> A, B

<sup>54</sup> A, B

<sup>55</sup> B

<sup>56</sup> B

<sup>57</sup> A, B

<sup>58</sup> B

<sup>59</sup> A, B

<sup>60</sup> A, B

<sup>61</sup> 'enim': B

praedicatum posset avis volare, et quod {inter subiectum et praedicatum istius propositionis, ‘Parisius est Roma’, essent centum milaria}<sup>62</sup>. Item, sequeretur quod subiectum posset comedere praedicatum, quia subiectum istius propositionis, ‘Homo est {panis}<sup>63</sup>’, posset <subiectum><sup>64</sup> comedere praedicatum, {scilicet panem}<sup>65</sup>.

Item sequitur quod homo esset propositio, quia omne compositum ex corpe et anima intellectiva est homo. Sed aliqua est propositio composita ex corpe et anima intellectiva, si res subiciuntur et praedicantur. Ergo aliqua esset propositio. Sed hoc consequens est falsum. Ergo est falsum dicere quod <haec><sup>66</sup> propositio compositur ex rebus, et per consequens in libri {praedicamenti}<sup>67</sup> in quo determinatur de partibus propositionis non determinatur de rebus.

Ad {illud}<sup>68</sup> dubium recolo me dixisse et in scriptis reliquisse quod intellectus potest facere propositionem ex quibuscumque, {quia}<sup>69</sup> intellectus potest asserere [illa]<sup>70</sup> esse eadem vel diversam, quia propositio non est aliud quam copulatio

between a subject and a predicate, or that between the subject and predicate of this statement, ‘Paris is Rome’, there would be 1000 miles. Likewise, it would follow that a subject could eat a predicate, because the subject of this statement, ‘A human is bread’, would be able to eat the predicate, namely, bread.

Likewise, it follows that a human would be a statement, because everything composed of a body and an intellectual soul is a human. But something is a statement composed of body and intellectual soul, if things can be made into subjects and predicates. Therefore, something would be a statement. But this consequent is false. Therefore, it is false to say that a statement is composed out of things, and consequently, the *Categories*, in which the parts of a statement are described, is not about things.

To this doubt I recall myself to have said and to have put down in writing that the intellect can make a statement out of anything whatsoever, because the intellect can assert those to be the same or to be different, because a statement

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<sup>62</sup> ‘inter subiectum et praedicatum essent centum milaria, quia inter subiectum huius propositionis, ‘parisius est roma’, et praedicatum eius sunt mille millaria’: A

<sup>63</sup> ‘panem’: B

<sup>64</sup> B

<sup>65</sup> ‘quia homo potest comedere istud panem’: A; ‘quia homo potest comedere panem’: B

<sup>66</sup> B

<sup>67</sup> ‘praedicamentorum’: A

<sup>68</sup> ‘hoc’: B

<sup>69</sup> ‘quae’: A

<sup>70</sup> A

aliquorum {per}<sup>71</sup> intellectum adinvicem, {ut propositio affirmativa,}<sup>72</sup> aut divisio aliquorum abinvicem, [ut propositio negativa]<sup>73</sup>. Quaecumque ergo intellectus potest componere adinvicem aut dividere abinvicem {ponent}<sup>74</sup> esse partes orationis, et per consequens esse subiecta vel praedicamenta. Sed intellectus potest adinvicem componere res asserendo illas esse easdem, et potest dividere res abinvicem asserendo illas non esse easdem. Potest etiam intellectus componere voces et conceptus adinvicem. Et ideo aliqua propositio componitur ex rebus extra animam, aliqua ex vocibus, aliqua ex conceptibus.

Quod {atque}<sup>75</sup> propositio possit componi ex rebus {probatur quattuor modis}<sup>76</sup>. Et primo sic. In omnibus significantibus et significatis [et]<sup>77</sup> ordinatis in significando est devenire ad ultimum significatum quod {ita}<sup>78</sup> significatur quod {alterius}<sup>79</sup> non {significat}<sup>80</sup>, aliter esset processus in infinitum essentialiter ordinatis, [contra philosophum]<sup>81</sup>. Sed propositio in scripto significat propositionem in voce,

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<sup>71</sup> ‘secundum’: B

<sup>72</sup> ‘affirmative vel negative’: B

<sup>73</sup> B

<sup>74</sup> ‘possunt’: A, B

<sup>75</sup> ‘autem’: A

<sup>76</sup> ‘probo’: A; ‘probo scilicet quadrupliciter’: B

<sup>77</sup> A, B

<sup>78</sup> ‘sic’: A, B

<sup>79</sup> ‘ulterius’: A, B

<sup>80</sup> ‘significatur’: A

<sup>81</sup> A, B

is nothing other than a putting together of some objects by the intellect, as in the case of an affirmative statement, or a setting apart of some objects from one another, as in the case of a negative statement. Therefore whatever the intellect can put together or set apart from one another can be parts of a sentence, and consequently can be a subject or a predicate. But the intellect is able to put together things, by asserting that they are the same, and can set things apart from one another by asserting that they are not the same. Also the intellect can put together utterances and concepts, and therefore some statement is composed of things outside the soul, another is composed of utterances, and another is composed of concepts.

That a statement can be composed of things I prove in four ways. First, in all signs and significates ordered in signification, one must come to a final significate, which is signified in such a way that it does not signify anything else, otherwise an essentially ordered infinity would occur, contrary to what Aristotle claims. But a written statement signifies a spoken statement, a spoken statement signifies a



[propositio in voce]<sup>82</sup> significat propositionem in {conceptu}<sup>83</sup>, scilicet propositionem compositam [ex conceptibus]<sup>84</sup>. Quaero tunc {aut}<sup>85</sup> propositio composita ex conceptibus sit ultimum significatum, [scilicet]<sup>86</sup> quod ulterius non <c4va> significat, aut significat aliquid ulterius. Non est dare primum, quia conceptus ex quibus propositio componitur in mente significant. Igitur tota propositio composita ex conceptibus significat. Cuius {nam}<sup>87</sup> partes significant et ipsum totum significat.

Quaero tunc de {illo}<sup>88</sup> quod significatur per propositionem in mente compositam ex conceptibus. Illud non potest esse simplex, quia {partes propositionis significant incomplexae, et illud quod significatur per totam propositionem est complexum. Ergo illud est compositum. Aut ergo illud est compositum ex conceptibus aut ex rebus}<sup>89</sup>. Si ex rebus, habeo propositum, scilicet quod propositio componitur ex rebus, [et consequenter sequitur illud]<sup>90</sup> {quod}<sup>91</sup> significatur per propositionem in mente esse complexum, et non est aliud complexum quam propositio. [Ergo, et cetera]<sup>92</sup>. Si sit

statement in the mind, namely, a statement composed of concepts. I ask, then, whether a statement composed of concepts is a final significate, namely one which does not in turn signify something else, or whether it in turn does signify something else. It must not be the first, because the concepts from which a statement is composed in the mind signify. Therefore the whole statement composed of concepts signifies, for that the parts of which signify, also as a whole signifies.

I ask, then, about that which is signified through a statement in the mind composed of concepts. That cannot be simple, because the parts of a statement signify non-complexes, and that which is signified through the whole statement is complex. Therefore, what is signified through a statement in the mind is composite. Therefore, either it is composed of concepts or of things. If of things, I have my claim, namely that there is a statement composed of things, and consequently it follows that what is signified through a statement in the mind is complex, and is nothing other than

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<sup>82</sup> B

<sup>83</sup> 'mente': A, B

<sup>84</sup> A

<sup>85</sup> 'an': A, B

<sup>86</sup> A, B

<sup>87</sup> 'enim': B

<sup>88</sup> 'isto': A

<sup>89</sup> 'partes propositionis significant partes of illius quod significatur per totam propositum. Ergo illud est compositum. Aut ergo est compositum ex rebus aut ex conceptibus': A; 'per partes illius quod significatur per totam propositionem. Ergo illud est compositum de rebus aut de conceptibus': B

<sup>90</sup> B

<sup>91</sup> 'quia illud': A

<sup>92</sup> A, B

compositum ex conceptibus, tunc, [[cum]<sup>93</sup> conceptus significant et]<sup>94</sup> non sunt {ultimum significatum}<sup>95</sup>, quaerendum est de significatio illius compositionis [ex conceptibus]<sup>96</sup> sicut prius. Et sic vel {procedendum est}<sup>97</sup> in infinitum vel tandem {est devenire}<sup>98</sup> ad aliquid compositum ex rebus quod est ultimum significatum propositionis in prolotione <et><sup>99</sup> in mente. Est {nam}<sup>100</sup> talis ordo in significando {secundum}<sup>101</sup> philosophum primo perihermeneias: litterae scriptae significant voces prolatas, et voces prolatae <significant><sup>102</sup> passiones animae, et passiones {[animae]<sup>103</sup>, scilicet conceptus animae,}<sup>104</sup> significant res. Unde sicut in isto ordine est dare primum significans, scilicet litteram scriptam <vel scripturam><sup>105</sup>, ita est dare ultimum significatum quod sic significatur ulterius non significat, et illud non potest esse conceptus. Ergo est res, distinguendo res contra vocem et conceptum. Ergo in {rebus}<sup>106</sup> est aliquid compositum cuius subiectum est res et praedicatum [similiter,

a statement. If it were composed of concepts, then, since the concepts would signify and are not final significates, one must ask what that statement composed of concepts signifies, just as before. And so either one must proceed to infinity, or at last one must come to something composed of things, which is the final significate of a spoken stament and a mental statement. For such is the order in signifying, according to Aristotle in book 1 of the *Perihermeneias*: written words signify spoken utterances, and spoken utterances signify affections of the soul, and affections of the soul, namely concepts in the mind, signify things. Hence just as in this order there must be a thing signifying first, namely a written word, so there must be a final significate which is so signified that it does not signify another, and that cannot be a concept. Therefore, it is a thing, by distinguishing a thing from an utterance and a concept. In things, then, there is something composed – the

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<sup>93</sup> B

<sup>94</sup> A

<sup>95</sup> ‘ultima significata’: A, B

<sup>96</sup> B

<sup>97</sup> ‘procederetur’: A

<sup>98</sup> ‘deveniretur’: A

<sup>99</sup> A, B

<sup>100</sup> ‘enim’: B

<sup>101</sup> ‘per’: B

<sup>102</sup> A, B

<sup>103</sup> A

<sup>104</sup> ‘vel conceptus’: B

<sup>105</sup> A

<sup>106</sup> ‘re’: B

[quod dicitur propositio in re]<sup>107</sup>]<sup>108</sup>.

Huic forte dicitur quod haec propositio, ‘Homo est lapis’, [est propositio]<sup>109</sup> scripta vel prolata vel in mente concepta [et]<sup>110</sup> non significat ultimatae nisi illas res, [scilicet]<sup>111</sup> lapidem et hominem. Contra, si ultimum significatum {illius propositionis}<sup>112</sup>, ‘homo est lapis’, non {sit nisi illae res, homo et lapis}<sup>113</sup>, tunc idem est dicere ‘homo lapis’ sicut <dicere><sup>114</sup> ‘homo est lapis’, et per consequens sicut haec est falsa, ‘homo est lapis’, ita haec {est falsa}<sup>115</sup>, ‘homo lapis’.

Et si dicitur quod quamvis {illae}<sup>116</sup> voces, ‘homo lapis’, et ‘homo est lapis’ significant idem ex parte rei, tamen non significant eodem modo, [et ideo una significat falsum et alia non. Contra, quaero de illo modo quo {haec}<sup>117</sup> vox ‘homo est lapis’ et haec vox ‘homo lapis’ significant ex quo non significant eodem modo]<sup>118</sup>. Aut ille modus tenet se ex parte

subject of which is a thing and the predicate likewise – which is called a *propositio in re*.

Here perhaps it is said that this statement, ‘A human is stone’, is a written or spoken statement, or one conceived in the mind, and it does not signify any final things except these things, namely a stone and a human. On the contrary, if the final significatum of this statement, ‘A human is stone’, is nothing except those things, a human and a stone, then it is the same to say ‘a human stone’ as ‘A human is stone’, and consequently just as this is false, ‘A human is stone’, so this is false, ‘a human stone’.

And if it is said that although these utterances, ‘a human stone’ and ‘A human is stone’, would signify the same on the part of reality, yet they do not signify in the same way, and therefore one signifies a false thing and the other not. On the contrary, I ask about the way in which this utterance ‘A human is stone’ and this utterance ‘a human stone’

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<sup>107</sup> A

<sup>108</sup> B

<sup>109</sup> B

<sup>110</sup> B

<sup>111</sup> B

<sup>112</sup> ‘huius’: A, B

<sup>113</sup> ‘sunt nisi isti termini, scilicet homo et lapis’: A

<sup>114</sup> A

<sup>115</sup> ‘omnino esset’: A

<sup>116</sup> ‘hae’: B

<sup>117</sup> ‘ista’: A

<sup>118</sup> B

rei aut ex parte intellectus. Si {primo modo}<sup>119</sup> cum res significatae per {dictas voces}<sup>120</sup> sint <omnino><sup>121</sup> eadem, nec ex parte rei {sit diversitas}<sup>122</sup>. Sequitur quod modus {erit}<sup>123</sup> idem, quia non potest esse diversitas modi <ex parte rei><sup>124</sup> nisi sit {aliqua}<sup>125</sup> diversitas ex parte rei. Si [autem]<sup>126</sup> {ille}<sup>127</sup> modus {tenet}<sup>128</sup> se ex parte intellectus, aut sibi {correspondet}<sup>129</sup> aliquid in re aut nihil. Si nihil ex parte rei sibi {correspondet}<sup>130</sup>, tunc est quod fictivum, {et non}<sup>131</sup> potest {aliquam diversitatem ponere}<sup>132</sup>. Si vero sibi {correspondet aliquid}<sup>133</sup> in re, cum ex parte rei sit identitas omnino, sequitur quod ex parte {modi {sit}<sup>134</sup> identitas omnino. Sic igitur inter illas orationes}<sup>135</sup> in comparatione ad sua significata <scilicet><sup>136</sup> ‘homo lapis’ et ‘homo est lapis’ non est alia diversitas, nec ex parte rei significatae, nec ex

signify, on account of which they do not signify in the same way. Either that way holds itself on the part of reality or on the part of the intellect. If on the part of reality, since the things signified through both expressions will be the same, there will be no diversity on the part of reality, it follows that the way will be the same, because there cannot be diversity in a way unless there is some diversity on the part reality. Yet if that way holds itself on the part of the intellect, either something or nothing in reality corresponds to it. If nothing on the part of reality corresponds to it, then that is some made up way [*fictivum*], and it cannot produce any diversity. Yet if something in reality does correspond to it, since on the part of reality there is a complete identity, it follows that on the part of the way in which they are

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<sup>119</sup> ‘ex parte rei’: A, B

<sup>120</sup> ‘duas voces dictas’: A; ‘duas voces’: B

<sup>121</sup> A, B

<sup>122</sup> ‘est aliqua diversitas modi’: A; ‘est aliquid diversitas’: B

<sup>123</sup> ‘est’: A, B

<sup>124</sup> A

<sup>125</sup> ‘alia’: B

<sup>126</sup> B

<sup>127</sup> ‘iste’: A

<sup>128</sup> ‘teneat’: B

<sup>129</sup> ‘correspondeat’: B

<sup>130</sup> ‘correspondeat’: A, B

<sup>131</sup> ‘nec’: A

<sup>132</sup> ‘facere aliquam diversitatem’: A, B

<sup>133</sup> ‘correspondeat aliquid’: A; ‘ergo correspondeat’: B

<sup>134</sup> ‘est’: A

<sup>135</sup> ‘rei’: B

<sup>136</sup> A

parte modi [significandi]<sup>137</sup>. Unde istud argumentum [primum]<sup>138</sup> quaerit de ultimo significato et adequato propositionis in prolotione {et}<sup>139</sup> in mente. Tale {nam}<sup>140</sup> significatum adequatum vel ultimum non potest esse vox {vel}<sup>141</sup> conceptus. Ergo est res extra animam {et per consequens aliquid complexum seu aliqua propositio extra animam componitur ex rebus tanquam ex subiecto et praedicato}<sup>142</sup>.

Secundo <eadem><sup>143</sup> probatur conclusio principalis sic, ex eisdem componuntur propositiones de quibus {fiunt}<sup>144</sup> quaestiones, sed quaestiones sunt de rebus extra animam. Ergo {et cetera}<sup>145</sup>. Maior patet, quia quae primo sunt quaestiones {postea {fiunt}<sup>146</sup> conclusiones, per philosophum secundum Posteriorum}<sup>147</sup>. Et ita oportet quod {conclusiones et

signified there is complete identity as well. So therefore between those utterances in comparison to their own significates – ‘a human stone’ and ‘A human is a stone’ – there is not any diversity, neither on the part of the things signified nor on the part of the way in which they are signified. Hence, this first argument seeks the final and adequate significate of a statement in speech and in the mind. For such an adequate or final significate is not able to be an utterance or a concept. Therefore, it is a thing outside the soul, and consequently some complex or some statement outside the soul is composed of things as of a subject and a predicate.

Second, the original conclusion can be proven in this way: statements are composed of those things out of which questions are constructed, but questions are of things outside the soul. Therefore statements are composed of things outside the mind. The major is clear, because those which at first are questions later become conclusions,

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<sup>137</sup> A, B

<sup>138</sup> B

<sup>139</sup> ‘vel’: A

<sup>140</sup> ‘enim’: B

<sup>141</sup> ‘nec’: B

<sup>142</sup> ‘composita ex rebus tanquam ex subiecto et praedicato, et per consequens est aliquid complexum extra animam, seu aliquam propositio composita, et cetera’: B

<sup>143</sup> A, B

<sup>144</sup> ‘fuerent’: A

<sup>145</sup> ‘propositiones componitur de rebus extra animam’: A, B

<sup>146</sup> ‘sunt’: A

<sup>147</sup> ‘per philosophum duo Posteriorum postea fiunt conclusiones’: B

quaestiones}<sup>148</sup> {fiunt}<sup>149</sup> de eisdem. Sed omnis conclusio est propositio. Igitur {est aliqua propositio ex rebus}<sup>150</sup>. Et minor patet, nam si quaeritur utrum homo sit risibilis, vel utrum terra sit rotunda, istae quaestiones sunt de rebus et non de conceptibus. Ergo et cetera.

Tertio potest eadem conclusio probari sic. Scientiae reales, ut physica <et><sup>151</sup> metaphysica, considerant {realiter}<sup>152</sup> res et non voces vel conceptus. Sed huiusmodi artifices faciunt suas demonstrationes ex his quae [primo et]<sup>153</sup> per se considerant <in illa scientia><sup>154</sup>. Ergo demonstrationes {quae fiunt in istis scientiis realibus}<sup>155</sup> {sunt}<sup>156</sup> ex rebus. Sed demonstrationes componitur ex propositionibus, scilicet ex premissis et conclusione. Ergo propositiones componuntur ex rebus.

Huic forte dicitur quod demonstrationes in scientiis realibus non fiunt ex illis quae per se considerantur in [illa]<sup>157</sup> scientia

according to Aristotle in book 2 of the *Posterior Analytics*. So it is necessary that conclusions and questions are constructed from the same things. But every conclusion is a statement. Therefore statements are made of the same things which conclusions are made of. And the minor is clear, for if it were asked whether a human is capable of laughter, or whether the earth is round, those questions are about things and not about concepts. Therefore, etc.

Third, the same conclusion can be proven in this way: the real sciences, such as physics and metaphysics, principally examine things, not utterances or concepts. But practitioners of these sciences make their demonstrations from those things which they examine first and *per se*. Therefore, demonstrations in the real sciences are made from things. But demonstrations are composed of statements, namely of premises and a conclusion. Therefore, statements are composed of things.

Here perhaps it is said that demonstrations in the real sciences are not made out of those which are considered

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<sup>148</sup> ‘propositiones et conclusiones’: B

<sup>149</sup> ‘sunt’: A

<sup>150</sup> ‘de eisdem sunt propositiones de quibus quaerunt conclusiones’: A; ‘de eisdem fiunt propositiones de quibus fiunt conclusiones’: B

<sup>151</sup> B; ‘vel’: A

<sup>152</sup> ‘principaliter’: A, B

<sup>153</sup> A, B

<sup>154</sup> B

<sup>155</sup> ‘in scientiis realibus’: A

<sup>156</sup> ‘fiunt’: A

<sup>157</sup> A

sed ex vocibus vel conceptibus supponentibus pro illis quae per se considerantur in illa scientia. Contra, subiectum adequatum scientiae acquisitae per <unam><sup>158</sup> demonstrationem est conclusio illius demonstrationis, [quia conclusio demonstrationis scitur, et illud quod scitur est subiectum scientiae]<sup>159</sup>. Quaero tunc an conclusio scita componatur ex rebus vel ex conceptibus vel ex vocibus. Si ex rebus, habeo propositum. Si ex vocibus vel conceptibus {solum}<sup>160</sup> sequitur quod nihil scitur nisi <4rb> vox vel conceptus, quod est inconueniens {in scientiis realibus maxime}<sup>161</sup>. Unde arguitur sic. Omnis propositio est vox vel conceptus. Sed omne demonstrative scitum est propositio. Ergo omne demonstrative scitum est vox vel conceptus. Conclusio [est]<sup>162</sup> falsam. [Ergo illud ex quo sequitur]<sup>163</sup>, sed non minor. Ergo maior. Ergo sua contradictoria est vera, scilicet aliqua propositio non est vox {vel}<sup>164</sup> conceptus. Sed omnis propositio <quae est><sup>165</sup> composita ex vocibus vel conceptibus est vox vel conceptus. Ergo aliquid propositio est quae nec est composita ex vocibus nec ex conceptibus, et per consequens composita ex rebus. {Ista ratio potest confirmari}<sup>166</sup> sic, de eisdem est omnino scientia nostra tradita de rebus naturalibus de quibus fuit scientia Aristotelis, quam nobis reliquit. Sed nec voces nec

*per se* in that science, but out of utterances or concepts suppositing for those which are considered *per se* in that science. On the contrary, the adequate subject of knowledge acquired through demonstration is the conclusion of that demonstration, because the conclusion of a demonstration is known, and that which is known is the subject of a science. I ask, then, whether the conclusion of a science is composed out of things or out of concepts or out of utterances. If out of things, I have my claim. If they are composed out of utterances or out of concepts alone, it follows that nothing is known except an utterance or a concept. That is especially ill-suited to the real sciences. Hence it is argued in this way. Every statement is an utterance or a concept. But everything demonstratively known is a statement. Therefore, everything demonstratively known is an utterance or a concept. The conclusion is false, but not the minor premise. Therefore, the major is false. Therefore, its own contradictory is true, namely that some statement is not an utterance or a concept. But every statement composed out of utterances or out of concepts is an utterance or a concept. Therefore, there is some statement which is composed of neither

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<sup>158</sup> A, B

<sup>159</sup> A

<sup>160</sup> ‘tunc’: A, B

<sup>161</sup> ‘maxime in scientiis realibus’: A, B

<sup>162</sup> A

<sup>163</sup> A; ‘aliqua praemissarum’: B

<sup>164</sup> ‘neque’: B

<sup>165</sup> B

<sup>166</sup> ‘confirmatur ratio sic’: A; ‘confirmatur ratio’: B

conceptibus sunt idem apud nos et apud Aristotelem, qui erat graecus. Ergo scientia nostra de [rebus]<sup>167</sup> naturalibus et scientia Aristotelis, quam nobis tradidit de eisdem, nec {est}<sup>168</sup> de vocibus nec de conceptibus. Ergo {est}<sup>169</sup> de rebus. Sed scientia est solius conclusionis demonstrationis. Ergo conclusio demonstrationis in scientia naturali nec est vox nec conceptus, et per consequens nec composita ex vocibus nec ex conceptibus <sed ex rebus><sup>170</sup>.

Quarto potest [eadem conclusio]<sup>171</sup> probari per auctoritates. Primo sic. Aristoteles {dicens}<sup>172</sup> in libro praedicamentorum, tractatum primo, capitulo {secundo}<sup>173</sup>, quod **quaedam praedicantur de subiecto et non in subiecto, ut subiectae secundae**. Quaero tunc {quod}<sup>174</sup> est illud quod praedicatur de subiecto et non in subiecto. Aut est res, {vox vel conceptus}<sup>175</sup>.

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<sup>167</sup> B

<sup>168</sup> 'sunt': A, B

<sup>169</sup> 'sunt': A, B

<sup>170</sup> B

<sup>171</sup> B

<sup>172</sup> 'dicit': A, B

<sup>173</sup> 'primo': A

<sup>174</sup> 'quia': A

<sup>175</sup> 'aut conceptus aut vox': A, B

utterances nor concepts, and consequently it is composed of things. That account can be confirmed in this way: the knowledge handed down to us about the natural world is entirely about the same objects as those which Aristotle's knowledge was about, a knowledge which he gave to us. But neither utterances nor concepts are the same with us and with Aristotle, who was Greek. Therefore, our knowledge of natural things, and the knowledge of Aristotle, which he handed down to us about those same things, is a knowledge neither of utterances nor of concepts. Therefore, it is of things. But knowledge is merely the conclusion of a demonstration. Therefore, the conclusion of a demonstration in natural science is neither an utterance nor a concept, and consequently is composed neither of utterances nor of concepts but rather of things.

Fourth, the same conclusion can be proved via philosophical authorities. First in this way: Aristotle says in the *Categories*, tract 1, chapter 2, that **certain things are predicated of a subject and are not in a subject, such as secondary substances**. I ask then what that is which is predicated of a subject but is not in a subject: is it a thing,



Si sit res extra animam, habitur propositum, {quia}<sup>176</sup> res extra animam praedicatur de subiecto, nec est dare quod illud sit vox vel conceptus, quia tam vox quam <etiam><sup>177</sup> conceptus est in subiecto. Unde cum aliquid praedicetur de subiecto [et]<sup>178</sup> non est in subiecto, et illud nec est vox vel conceptus, sequitur quod aliquid praedicetur [de subiecto]<sup>179</sup>, quod nec vox nec conceptus. <Sequitur><sup>180</sup> ergo oportet quod illud sit res extra animam.

Item Aristoteles {primo}<sup>181</sup> Perihermeneias, [caput de oratione]<sup>182</sup>, {asserit}<sup>183</sup> {res}<sup>184</sup> de re praedicari, dicens **Haec quidem rerum sunt universalia, illa vero singularia. Universale quidem de pluribus aptum natum est praedicari, ut homo quidem universale, Plato vero singulare.** Et illud totum exponit Boethius de rebus [et]<sup>185</sup> non de vocibus, dicens quod cum Aristoteles <de propositionibus><sup>186</sup> ageret tractatum suum {continuavit}<sup>187</sup> ad

an utterance, or a concept? If it is a thing outside the soul, I have my claim, because a thing outside the soul is predicated of a subject. Nor can it be that it is an utterance or a concept, because both an utterance and a concept are in a subject. Hence since something is predicated of a subject and is not in a subject, and that is neither an utterance nor a concept, it follows that something is predicated of a subject which is neither an utterance nor a concept. Therefore, it is necessary that it is a thing outside the soul.

Likewise, Aristotle, in the first chapter of the *Perihermeneias*, in the chapter on sentences, says that a thing is predicated of a thing, saying **Indeed these things are universals, but those singulars. A universal is naturally suited to be predicated, so that human indeed is universal, but Plato is singular.** And Boethius interprets that whole claim to be about things and not about utterances, saying that when Aristotle pushes on with his

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<sup>176</sup> ‘quod’: A, B

<sup>177</sup> B

<sup>178</sup> B

<sup>179</sup> A

<sup>180</sup> B

<sup>181</sup> ‘secundo’: A

<sup>182</sup> B

<sup>183</sup> ‘dicit’: B

<sup>184</sup> ‘rem’: A

<sup>185</sup> A

<sup>186</sup> A

<sup>187</sup> ‘continuat’: A, B

res. **Rerum {vero}<sup>188</sup> quaedam praedicantur ut universalia, quaedam subiciuntur ut singularia.**

Item philosophus in libro *Perihermeneias* [caput de verbo]<sup>189</sup> dicit quod **verbum est nota eorum quae de altero praedicantur**, [ubi Boethius dicit quod omne verbum est significativum eorum quae de altero praedicantur]<sup>190</sup>, et dico quod ‘currit’ significat [illud]<sup>191</sup> quod de currente <cursus><sup>192</sup> praedicatur, ‘currit’ {vero}<sup>193</sup> et {‘amat’}<sup>194</sup> ad res tamen {designandas}<sup>195</sup> inventa sunt. Cum ergo ‘currit’ {significet}<sup>196</sup> illud quod de altero <currente><sup>197</sup> praedicatur, et <sic><sup>198</sup> ‘currit’ solum {significet}<sup>199</sup> rem et non vocem secundum Boethius, sequitur [quod res de re praedicatur]<sup>200</sup>. Et credo quod illud indubitanter sit verum, quod in aliqua propositione praedicatur res de re, et in aliqua propositione conceptus de conceptu praedicatur, et in aliqua vox de voce praedicatur. Unde intellectus potest componere adinvicem omnia simplicia apprehensa per intellectum asserendo illa esse

treatise, he links it to things. **But certain things are predicated, like universals, others are made subjects, like singulars.**

Likewise, Aristotle, in the *Perihermeneias*, in the chapter on verbs, says that **a verb is a mark of those which are predicated of another**, and I say that ‘runs’ signifies that which is predicated of some running individual, but ‘runs’ and ‘walks’ are found to designate things. Therefore, since ‘runs’ signifies that which is predicated of another, and ‘runs’ only signifies a thing and not an utterance, according to Boethius, it follows that a thing is predicated of a thing. And I believe that this is undoubtedly true, that in some statement a thing is predicated of a thing, and in some statement a concept is predicated of a concept, and in some statement an utterance is predicated of an utterance. Hence the intellect can put together every simple thing apprehended by the intellect, by asserting that they are the same or are not the same. Therefore, since the intellect is

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<sup>188</sup> ‘ergo’: A

<sup>189</sup> A, B

<sup>190</sup> A

<sup>191</sup> A, B

<sup>192</sup> B

<sup>193</sup> ‘autem’: A

<sup>194</sup> ‘ambulat’: B

<sup>195</sup> ‘assignandas’: B

<sup>196</sup> ‘significat’: A, B

<sup>197</sup> B

<sup>198</sup> A, B

<sup>199</sup> ‘significat’: A, B

<sup>200</sup> B

eadem vel non esse eadem. Cum {igitur}<sup>201</sup> intellectus possit {exponere}<sup>202</sup> voces, conceptus et res, sequitur quod intellectus potest componere {propositionem tam de rebus quam de vocibus quam de conceptibus}<sup>203</sup>.

Intelligenda sunt hic tria. Primo quod in omni propositione est {aliquid}<sup>204</sup> materiale et {aliquid}<sup>205</sup> formale. Formale in propositione est copula copulans praedicatum cum subiecto et illa copula est in intellectu, quia est compositio vel divisio [intellectus]<sup>206</sup>. Materialia {vero}<sup>207</sup> in propositione sunt subiectum et praedicatum. Dico ergo quod nulla {propositio}<sup>208</sup> est composita ex rebus totaliter extra animam, quia formale in tali propositione est in mente vel in intellectu. {Materialia autem}<sup>209</sup> sunt extra animam. {Unde}<sup>210</sup> cum propositio sit triplex – quaedam in prolatione, quaedam in conceptu, et quaedam significata per propositionem in conceptu quae potest dici propositio in re – propositio primo modo dicta, scilicet propositio in prolatione, est totaliter extra animam, {et}<sup>211</sup> talis propositio totaliter componitur ex vocibus qui habent esse extra animam. {Propositio vero}<sup>212</sup> composita

able to grasp utterances, concepts and things, it follows that the intellect can put together a statement composed of things to the same extent as it can put together one composed of utterances or concepts.

We must understand three things here. First, that in every statement there is something material and something formal. The formal element in a statement is the copula joining together the predicate with the subject, and that copula is in the intellect, because it is a composition or division of the intellect. Yet the material elements in a statement are the subject and the predicate. Therefore I say that no statement is composed of things completely outside the soul, because the formal element is such a statement is in the mind, that is, in the intellect, yet the material elements are outside of the mind. Hence, since a statement is of three sorts – a certain spoken one, a certain conceptual one, and a certain one signified through a conceptual statement which can be called a *propositio in re* – a statement spoken of in the first way, namely a spoken

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<sup>201</sup> ‘ergo’: A

<sup>202</sup> ‘apprehendere’: A, B

<sup>203</sup> ‘res, voces, et etiam conceptus, et per consequens potest facere propositionem ex rebus tam ex vocibus quam etiam ex conceptibus’: A, B

<sup>204</sup> ‘aliquid’: B

<sup>205</sup> ‘aliquid’: B

<sup>206</sup> A

<sup>207</sup> ‘ergo’: B

<sup>208</sup> ‘compositio mixta’: B

<sup>209</sup> ‘Et materialia’: B

<sup>210</sup> ‘Verumtamen’: B

<sup>211</sup> ‘quia’: A

<sup>212</sup> ‘Et propositio’: B

ex conceptibus est totaliter in intellectu. Et {compositio}<sup>213</sup> composita ex rebus partim est in intellectu et partim extra intellectu, quantum ad suum formale est in intellectu {sed}<sup>214</sup> quantum ad materialia est totaliter extra intellectum.

Secundo sciendum est quod compositio est duplex, scilicet {realis et intellectualis}<sup>215</sup>. Compositio intellectualis est <ut><sup>216</sup> compositio qua intellectus componit {subiectum cum praedicato}<sup>217</sup>. Compositio realis est ut compositio animae cum corpore, {et}<sup>218</sup> ut compositio domus ex lapidibus vel lignis.

Tertio est sciendum quod isti termini, ‘subiectum’ et ‘praedicatum’, sunt [termini]<sup>219</sup> equivoci, quia uno modo accipiuntur per subiecto vel praedicato in re, in alio modo pro subiecto vel praedicato in intellectu, in alio modo pro subiecto vel praedicato in voce.

Sed dubium est hic qualiter potest fieri unum compositum ex re existente in intellectu et {re}<sup>220</sup> existente extra animam.

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<sup>213</sup> ‘propositio’: A, B

<sup>214</sup> ‘et’: A

<sup>215</sup> ‘intellectualis et realis’: B

<sup>216</sup> A

<sup>217</sup> ‘praedicatum cum subiecto’: A

<sup>218</sup> ‘vel’: A

<sup>219</sup> B

<sup>220</sup> ‘rebus’: A

statement, is completely outside the soul, yet a statement composed of concepts is completely in the intellect, and a composition composed of things is partly in the intellect and partly outside the intellect. With respect to its formal element, a statement composed of things is in the intellect, but with respect to its material elements, it is completely outside of the intellect.

Second, we must know that there are two kinds of composition, namely real and intellectual. An intellectual composition is a composition in which the intellect puts together a subject with a predicate. A real composition is, for example, the composition of a soul with a body, or the composition of a house out of bricks or wood.

Third, we must know that these terms, ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’, are equivocal terms, because in one way they are taken for a subject or a predicate in reality, in another way for a subject or a predicate in the intellect, and in another way for a subject or predicate in speech.

But there is a doubt here: how, from a thing existing in the intellect and a thing existing outside the soul, can there

Dicendum quod ex <c4va> talibus <bene><sup>221</sup> potest fieri unum compositum compositione intellectuali, non <tamen><sup>222</sup> compositione reali, et tale compositum potest dici ens copulatum, et <potest fieri ens copulatum><sup>223</sup> non solum per intellectum sed etiam per sensum, {vel}<sup>224</sup> per intentionem sensus. Dicit {enim}<sup>225</sup> Beatus Augustinus quod intentio copulat sensum vel operationem sensus cum sensibili obiecto. Multotiens {nam}<sup>226</sup> visibile {offertur sensui, quod tamen praesens sensui}<sup>227</sup> non sentitur si sensus non advertat {nec attendat}<sup>228</sup> ad obiectum. Multotiens enim <sunt><sup>229</sup> colores {et}<sup>230</sup> visibilia ante visum, et tamen non videmus ea, quia non habemus intentionem ad illa. Sed cum intendimus {ea}<sup>231</sup>, videmus ea. Unde intentio copulat actum visus vel visum cum obiecto. Unde haec vox, ‘lapis visus’, significat quoddam ens copulatum ex lapide qui est extra animam et [ex]<sup>232</sup> actu videndi qui est in oculo, nec est inconveniens quod ex talibus sic {loco et {situs}<sup>233</sup>}<sup>234</sup> separatis fiat [vere]<sup>235</sup> unum ens copulatum.

come about one composite thing? It must be said that from such things there can come about one thing composed by a composition of the intellect, not by a real composition, and such a composite can be called an *ens copulatum*, and an *ens copulatum* can come about not only through the intellect but also through one’s sense faculty, or through the attention [*intentio*] of that sense faculty. For Blessed Augustine says that attention couples a sense or the operation of a sense with a sensible object. For oftentimes something visible is offered to a sense, yet that which is present to that sense is not sensed if the sense neither turns nor attends to the object. For oftentimes colors and things which can be seen are before our vision, and yet we do not see them because we do not have our attention directed at them. But when we pay attention to them, then we see them. Hence attention couples the act of seeing or sight with an object. For example, this utterance, ‘seen stone’, signifies a certain being composed out of stone which is

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<sup>221</sup> A

<sup>222</sup> A, B

<sup>223</sup> A, B

<sup>224</sup> ‘sive’: A

<sup>225</sup> ‘nam’: A

<sup>226</sup> ‘enim’: B

<sup>227</sup> ‘est praesens visui, et’: A, B

<sup>228</sup> ‘vel intendit’: B

<sup>229</sup> A

<sup>230</sup> ‘vel’: A, B

<sup>231</sup> ‘illa’: A

<sup>232</sup> A

<sup>233</sup> ‘subiecto’: B

<sup>234</sup> ‘loquendo’: A

Ad rationes in contrarium respondetur. Ad primam, quando dicitur quod si propositio componeretur ex rebus, {sequitur quod}<sup>236</sup> inter subiectum et praedicatum posset avis volare, dicendum distinguendo de subiecto et praedicato quam possunt accipi <vel><sup>237</sup> pro rebus, <vel><sup>238</sup> pro vocibus, {et}<sup>239</sup> pro conceptibus. Si accipiuntur pro rebus, tunc {id}<sup>240</sup> quod deducitur, non est inconveniens.

Ad alia duo sequentia, cum dicitur quod inter subiectum et praedicatum <essent vel><sup>241</sup> possent esse {mille}<sup>242</sup> milia, dicendum quod, accipiendo subiectum et praedicatum pro rebus, [hoc]<sup>243</sup> est verum.

Ad aliud, {cum}<sup>244</sup> dicitur [quod]<sup>245</sup> <si sic, tunc aliqua propositio componeretur ex corpore et anima intellectu, et per

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<sup>235</sup> A, B

<sup>236</sup> ‘tunc’: A, B

<sup>237</sup> A, B

<sup>238</sup> A, B

<sup>239</sup> ‘vel’: A, B

<sup>240</sup> ‘illud ad’: A, B

<sup>241</sup> B

<sup>242</sup> ‘centum’: A, B

<sup>243</sup> A, B

<sup>244</sup> ‘quando’: B

outside the soul and the act of seeing which is in the eye, nor is it unfitting that from such things separated by place and subject there comes about an *ens copulatum*.

Here are responses to the reasons to the contrary. To the first, when it is said that if a statement were composed of things, it would follow that a bird would be able to fly between a subject and a predicate, one should respond to this objection by making a distinction concerning ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’, insofar as they can be taken to mean things, or utterances, or concepts. If they are taken to mean things, then that which has been deduced is not problematic.

To the other two following it, when it is said that between a subject and a predicate there could be 1000 miles, one ought to say that, by taking up ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’ for things, this is true.

To the other, when it is said that, if my position were correct, then some statement would be composed of body

consequens<sup>246</sup> aliqua propositio {esset}<sup>247</sup> homo, quia <aliqua><sup>248</sup> propositio componitur ex corpore et anima intellectiva, dicendum quod ex hoc non sequitur quod aliqua propositio sit homo. Et {cum}<sup>249</sup> dicitur <quod><sup>250</sup> omne [quod]<sup>251</sup> componitur ex corpore et anima intellectiva est homo, dicendum quod omne compositum ex corpore et anima intellectiva compositione reali est homo. Tamen non oportet omne compositum {ex corpore et anima intellectiva compositione intellectuali}<sup>252</sup> sit homo.

Sed dubium est an ipsi copulae existenti in intellectu correspondeat aliquid in re aut non. Dicendum <est><sup>253</sup> quod copulae existenti in intellectu copulanti extrema propositionis {vere}<sup>254</sup> adinvicem, {correspondet aliquid}<sup>255</sup> [in re]<sup>256</sup>, scilicet identitas [extremorum vel identitas]<sup>257</sup> eorum pro quibus extrema <propositionis><sup>258</sup> supponunt. Divisioni vero

and intellective soul, and consequently some statement would be a human, because some statement is composed out of body and intellective soul, one should say that from my position it does not follow that some statement is a human. And when it is said that everything which is composed of body and intellective soul is a human, one should say that everything composed of body and intellective soul *by a real composition* is a human. Yet it is not necessary that everything composed out of body and intellective soul *by an intellectual composition* is a human.

But there is a doubt whether or not something in reality corresponds to a copula existing in the intellect. It must be said that to the copula existing in the intellect, truly copulating the extremes of a statement, there corresponds something in reality, namely the identity of the extremes or of those for which the extremes supposit. Moreover, to a

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<sup>245</sup> B

<sup>246</sup> A, B

<sup>247</sup> 'posset esse': B

<sup>248</sup> A

<sup>249</sup> 'quando': B

<sup>250</sup> A, B

<sup>251</sup> A, B

<sup>252</sup> 'compositione intellectuali ex corpore et anima intellectiva': B

<sup>253</sup> B

<sup>254</sup> 'affirmative': A

<sup>255</sup> 'aliquid correspondet': B

<sup>256</sup> A

<sup>257</sup> B

<sup>258</sup> B

{vel}<sup>259</sup> negationi copulae in propositione negativa vera correspondet aliquid in re, scilicet diversitas extremorum vel illorum pro quibus extrema supponunt. {Sed}<sup>260</sup> copulae existenti in intellectu copulanti extrema propositionis falsae adinvicem nihil correspondet in re nisi ipsa extrema, ut patet de copula huius propositionis, ‘homo est asinus’. Similiter nec divisioni {vel}<sup>261</sup> negationi copulae in propositione falsa negativa nihil correspondet in re nisi ipsa extrema. Et si quaeratur a quo ergo movetur intellectus ad fabricandum huiusmodi copulam {vel}<sup>262</sup> divisionem vel negationem copulae, dicendum quod non movetur nisi ab <ipsius><sup>263</sup> extremis ipsis in propositione et a voluntate imperante intellectui ad copulandum extrema adinvicem vel ad dividendum extrema abinvicem [si propositio sit falsa]<sup>264</sup>.

< Capitulum 12: De Priore et Posteriore >

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[...]

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<sup>259</sup> ‘seu’: A

<sup>260</sup> ‘et’: A

<sup>261</sup> ‘nec’: A, B

<sup>262</sup> ‘seu’: A, B

<sup>263</sup> A

<sup>264</sup> A, B

division or to a negation of the copula in a true negative statement there corresponds something in reality, namely the diversity of the extremes or of those for which the extremes supposit. Likewise, to a division or to a negation of the copula in a false negative statement nothing corresponds in reality except those extremes, as is with respect to the copula in this statement, ‘A human is an ass’. Likewise, nothing corresponds to a division or to a negative copula in a false negative proposition except those extremes. And if one were to ask by what therefore is the intellect moved to creating a copula of this sort or a division or negation of the copula, it must be said that the intellect is only moved by those extremes in the statement and by the will commanding the intellect to put the extremes together or to divide them from one another.

<Chapter 12: On the Prior and the Posterior>



**{Videtur autem praeter eos qui dicti sunt alter esse prioris modus. Eorum nam quae convertuntur secundum essentiae consequentiam quod alterum alteri quomodolibet causa est digne prius naturam dicitur, quia vero quaedam sunt huiusmodi palam est. Esse namque hominem convertitur secundum essentiae consequentiam ad veram de se orationem. Nam si homo est, vera est oratio qua dicitur, quia homo est, et homo convertitur oratio quia est, nam si vera est oratio qua dicitur, quia homo est, hominem esse necesse est. Est autem vera oratio nequaquam causa quod res sit. Verumtamen videtur res esse quodammodo causa, ut sit oratio vera. Dum nam res est vel res non est, vera oratio aut falsa dicatur necesse est. Ideoque secundum quinque modos prius alterum altero dicitur}**<sup>265</sup>.

Haec est quinta {particula}<sup>266</sup> huius capituli in qua philosophus {addit}<sup>267</sup> quintum modum <prioris><sup>268</sup> dicens quod {praeter modos}<sup>269</sup> qui dicti sunt est {unus alius}<sup>270</sup>, scilicet {quod}<sup>271</sup> aliqua convertuntur secundum {naturam}<sup>272</sup>, et unum illorum

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<sup>265</sup> ‘amplius praeter hos’: A, B

<sup>266</sup> ‘pars’: A

<sup>267</sup> ‘ponit’: A

<sup>268</sup> B

<sup>269</sup> ‘primi’: B

<sup>270</sup> ‘unum’: B

<sup>271</sup> ‘quando’: B; ‘quod quando’: A

<sup>272</sup> ‘consequentiam’: A, B

**It seems however that there is another mode of the prior beyond those which were mentioned. For of those which are converted according to the consequence of essence, that which is in some way the cause of the other is rightly called prior by nature. That there are kinds of this sort is clear. For being a human is converted according to the consequence of essence to a true sentence about itself. For if a human is, the sentence by which it is said that a human is, is true, and a human is converted with a sentence, that he is. For if the sentence is true by which it is said that a human is, a human’s existing is necessary. However a true sentence is never the cause that a thing is. Yet it does seem that the thing’s being is in some way the cause that the sentence is true. For while a thing is or a thing is not, it is necessary that the sentence is called true or false. Therefore in five ways is one called prior to another.**

This is the fifth part of this chapter, in which Aristotle adds a fifth mode of priority, saying that beyond the modes which were mentioned there is another one, namely that when some things are convertible according to

est causa alterius, tunc illud quod est causa [alterius]<sup>273</sup> est prius natura quam illud cuius est causa. Verbi gratia, haec oratio, ‘homo est’, et {haec oratio, ‘‘homo est’ est vera’}<sup>274</sup>, convertuntur. Nam hominem esse et hominem esse <est><sup>275</sup> verum convertuntur. {Nam}<sup>276</sup> sequitur, ‘homo est, ergo haec est vera, ‘homo est’’, et converso, <scilicet><sup>277</sup> haec est vera, ‘‘homo est’, ergo homo est’. Sed hominem esse est causa quare haec est vera, ‘homo est’, et non e converso. {Unde quia homo est, haec oratio est vera quae dicit hominem esse}<sup>278</sup>. Nam in eo quod res est vel non est, {est oratio}<sup>279</sup> vera vel falsa, sed ista oratio, ‘‘homo est’ est vera’ non est causa {quare}<sup>280</sup> homo est, et ideo hominem esse est prius {quam haec oratio, ‘‘homo est’ {est}<sup>281</sup> vera’}<sup>282</sup>. Unde breviter quintus modus priorus est {quando}<sup>283</sup> illud quod convertitur cum aliquo [et]<sup>284</sup> est causa illius, est naturaliter prius {illo}<sup>285</sup>.

consequence, and one of those is the cause of the other, then that which is the cause of the other is prior in nature to that of which it is a cause. For example, this sentence, ‘A human exists’, and this sentence, ‘‘A human exists’ is true’, are convertibles. For a human’s existing, and a human’s existing being true are convertible. For it follows: ‘A human exists, therefore this is true: ‘A human exists’’, and, conversely: ‘This is true, ‘A human exists’, therefore a human exists’. But a human’s existing is the cause by which this is true: ‘A human exists’, and not conversely. Hence, because a human exists, that sentence is true which says that a human exists. For it is in this – that a thing exists or does not exist – that a sentence is true or false. But that sentence, ‘‘A human exists’ is true’, is not the cause by which a human exists, and therefore a human’s existing is prior by nature. Hence, briefly, the fifth mode of priority is when that which is convertible with another and is the cause of it, is naturally prior to it.

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<sup>273</sup> A

<sup>274</sup> ‘oratio qui dicit, ‘‘homo est’ est vera oratio’: A, B

<sup>275</sup> B

<sup>276</sup> ‘quia’: A

<sup>277</sup> B

<sup>278</sup> ‘Unde quod homo est, est causa quod haec est vera, ‘homo est’, ideo haec oratio est vera qui dicit hominem esse’: B

<sup>279</sup> ‘oratio dicitur’: B

<sup>280</sup> ‘quod’: B

<sup>281</sup> ‘sit’: A

<sup>282</sup> ‘natura’: B

<sup>283</sup> ‘quod’: A, B

<sup>284</sup> B

<sup>285</sup> ‘alio’: A

Circa istam partem sunt tria intelligenda. Primo quod ex dictis {Aristotelis}<sup>286</sup> [hic]<sup>287</sup> accipitur unum commune dictum antiquorum, scilicet quod omnis propositio convertitur cum {vero}<sup>288</sup> enunciato de suo dicto, hoc est, omnis propositio convertitur cum {alia}<sup>289</sup> propositione in qua verum praedicatur de dicto illius propositionis, et hoc [secundum quod]<sup>290</sup> illud dictum supponit pro {suppositione}<sup>291</sup> cuius est dictum.

Secundum est intelligendum quod cum dicitur {ex}<sup>292</sup> **eo quod res est vel non est**, et cetera, philosophus <per ‘rem’><sup>293</sup> non intelligit rem significatam per subiectum, nec rem significatam per praedicatum, quia de non ente vere praedicatur aliquid tanquam de subiecto, quia de non ente verum est dicere ipsum esse non ens, et ita propositio affirmativa potest esse vera quamvis res significata per praedicatum sit non ens, sed philosophus per ‘rem’ intelligit rem significatam per totam propositionem, et tunc intelligitur sic: {ex}<sup>294</sup> **eo quod res est**, hoc est, ex eo quod ita est sicut <vera><sup>295</sup> propositio significat est propositio vera, [et ex eo quod non est ita sicut propositio significat est propositio falsa]<sup>296</sup>. Et ex hoc patet {quod per

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<sup>286</sup> ‘philosophi’: B

<sup>287</sup> A

<sup>288</sup> ‘uno’: B

<sup>289</sup> ‘aliqua’: B

<sup>290</sup> B

<sup>291</sup> ‘propositione’: A

<sup>292</sup> ‘in’: A, B

<sup>293</sup> B

<sup>294</sup> ‘in’: A, B

<sup>295</sup> B

<sup>296</sup> A

Concerning that part, we need to understand three things. First, that given these words Aristotle accepts here a general *dictum* of the old philosophers, namely that every statement is convertible with a true statement about its own *dictum*, that is, every statement is convertible with another statement in which ‘true’ is predicated of the *dictum* of that statement, and this is because that *dictum* supposits for the statement of which it is an *dictum*.

Second, we must understand that when it is said **on account of this that a thing exists or does not exist**, etc., Aristotle does not understand by ‘thing’ the thing signified through the subject, nor the thing signified through the predicate, because something is truly predicated of a non-being as a subject, because it is true to say of a non-being that it is not a being, and so an affirmative statement can be true although the thing signified through the predicate is not a being. Rather, by ‘thing’, Aristotle understands the thing signified through the whole statement, and then it is understood in this way: **on account of this that a thing exists**, that is, from the fact that it is just as the statement

propositionem in voce et etiam in conceptu}<sup>297</sup> significatur aliqua res complexa quae non est proprie aliqua res [precise]<sup>298</sup> significata [per subiectum, nec <praecise><sup>299</sup> res significata]<sup>300</sup> per praedicatum, sed aggregatum ex his, {et}<sup>301</sup> illa res quae est ultimum et adaequatum significatum propositionis in voce et in conceptu est {quaedam}<sup>302</sup> ens copulatum, et [propter hoc]<sup>303</sup> potest dici propositio in re, sicut declaratum est in principio {huius}<sup>304</sup> libri.

Tertio est intelligendum quod cum dicitur aliquid est prius alio natura, per hoc non denotatur quod illud prius sit in aliqua mensura in qua non est posterius, ut si *a* sit prius natura quam *b*, ex hoc non sequitur quod *a* sit aliquando quando non est *b*, vel {quod}<sup>305</sup> *a* fuit vel erit aliquando quando non fuit vel erit *b*. Nec est dicere sicut quidam fingunt quod quaedam instantia naturae ita quod prius natura est in aliquo instanti in quo non est posterius natura, quia illud instans aut est substantia aut accidens. Non <est><sup>306</sup> substantia, quia tunc cum Socrates sit

signifies, the statement is true. And from the fact that it is not as the statement signifies, the statement is false. And from this it is clear that through a statement in speech and also in concept some complex thing is signified which is not properly something precisely signified through the subject, nor is it a thing signified precisely through the predicate, but it is an aggregate of these, and that thing which is the final and adequate significate of a statement in speech and in concept is a certain *ens copulatum*, and on account of this it can be called a *propositio in re*, just as was stated in the prologue of this book.

Third, we must understand that when it is said that something is prior by nature to another, through this it is not denoted that the prior is in some measured amount in which the posterior is not. For example, if *a* is prior by nature to *b*, from this it does not follow that *a* exists at some time that *b* does not exist, or that *a* existed or will exist at a time when *b* does not exist. Nor does it mean (just as certain individuals pretend) that a certain instance of nature is such that that which is prior by nature is in

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<sup>297</sup> ‘vel per propositionem in voce vel in conceptu’: B

<sup>298</sup> A

<sup>299</sup> A

<sup>300</sup> B

<sup>301</sup> ‘quia’: A

<sup>302</sup> ‘quoddam’: A

<sup>303</sup> A

<sup>304</sup> ‘istius’: B

<sup>305</sup> ‘quando’: B

<sup>306</sup> B

prius natura suo accidente, Socrates in aliqua substantia, [scilicet]<sup>307</sup> in Socrates, vel in aliqua parte {Socrates}<sup>308</sup> esset prior suo accidente, quod non contingit dicere. Et si {detur}<sup>309</sup> quod sit accidens, cum Socrates sit prior natura omni suo accidente, sequitur quod Socrates in aliquo suo accidente sit prior omni suo accidente, quod est impossibile. Et potest hoc argui de prima substantia quae est deus, quod non est prior {naturaliter}<sup>310</sup> omni instanti naturae. Si talia instantia {darentur ergo deus in aliquo instanti naturae esset prior omni instanti naturae. Significaretur igitur quod deus in aliquo instanti foret prior omni instanti quando illud instans non esset, quod est inconueniens}<sup>311</sup>.

Item prius natura et posterius natura sunt in eodem instanti temporis, ut patet de subiecto et sua propria passione. Ergo si subiectum sit prius natura in aliquo instanti naturae in quo <instanti><sup>312</sup> sua passio non est, sequitur quod in eodem

some instance in which its posterior by nature is not, because that instance is either a substance or an accident. It is not a substance, because then, since Socrates is prior by nature to his accidents, Socrates would be prior to his accident in some substance (namely in Socrates or in some part of Socrates), which one is not able to say. And if it is said that that instance is an accident, since Socrates is prior by nature to all of his accidents, it follows that Socrates, in some accident of his, is prior to each of his accidents, which is impossible. And we can make this argument with respect to the first substance – God – that he is not naturally prior to every instance of nature. If instances of that sort were posited, therefore God would be in some instance of nature that is prior to every instance of nature, and so it would follow that God would be in some instance of nature and then God would be in some instance when that instance does not exist, which is problematic.

Likewise, prior by nature and posterior by nature are in the same instance of time, as is clear in the case of a subject and its proper attribute. Therefore, if a substance were prior by nature in some instance of nature in which its own

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<sup>307</sup> B

<sup>308</sup> ‘Socratis’: A

<sup>309</sup> ‘dicatur’: B

<sup>310</sup> ‘natura’: B

<sup>311</sup> ‘ponantur, ergo deus in aliquo instanti naturae esset prior omni instanti naturae, et sic sequeretur quod deus in aliquo instanti esset et tunc deus esset in aliquo instanti quam illud instans non esset, quod est inconueniens’: A; ‘ponantur quod deus in aliquo instanti naturae esset prior omni instanti naturae, sequeretur quod deus in aliquo instanti foret prior omni instanti quam illud instans non esset, quod est inconueniens’: B

<sup>312</sup> A

instanti temporis in quo <suum><sup>313</sup> subiectum est sua passio non est, et sic repugnantia [et contradictoria]<sup>314</sup> essent simul vera <et sic contradictoria essent vera><sup>315</sup> pro instanti eodem temporis, quod est impossibile. Dicendum est ergo quod non magis debet poni instans naturae quando aliquid est prius [natura]<sup>316</sup> alio quam debet poni instans <temporis><sup>317</sup> honoris vel perfectionis [quando aliquid est prius honore vel perfectione alio]<sup>318</sup>. Unde non est ponere aliud instans quam instans temporis, nec propter hoc quod aliquid ponitur prius alio {aliquorum}<sup>319</sup> istorum modorum hic {positorum}<sup>320</sup> debet poni instans vel mensura in qua prius est, <vel><sup>321</sup> fuit vel [erit]<sup>322</sup>, et in {illa posterius}<sup>323</sup> non est, <vel><sup>324</sup> [non]<sup>325</sup> fuit vel non erit, nisi solum quando aliquid est prius alio tempore, [quia]<sup>326</sup> tunc {est verum}<sup>327</sup> dicere quod prius est vel fuit vel erit <in><sup>328</sup> aliquo instanti vel <in><sup>329</sup> aliquo tempore in quo posterius non est vel non fuit vel non erit.

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<sup>313</sup> B

<sup>314</sup> A, B

<sup>315</sup> A

<sup>316</sup> A

<sup>317</sup> B

<sup>318</sup> B

<sup>319</sup> ‘aliquo’: A

<sup>320</sup> ‘praedicamentorum’: B

<sup>321</sup> A, B

<sup>322</sup> A

<sup>323</sup> ‘isto posteriori’: A

<sup>324</sup> A, B

<sup>325</sup> B

<sup>326</sup> A, B

<sup>327</sup> ‘verum enim est’: A, B

<sup>328</sup> B

<sup>329</sup> B

attribute did not exist, it would follow that in the same instance of time in which a subject exists, its own attribute would not exist, and so opposites and contradictories would be true at once for the same instance of time, which is impossible. Therefore, we ought to say that we should not hold more highly an instance of nature when something is prior by nature from another, than we should hold an instance of honor or perfection when something is prior in honor or perfection than another. Hence we should not admit some instance other than an instance of time, nor on account of this, that something is regarded as prior to another, should we posit an instance or a measured amount in which the prior is, was, or will be, and in which the posterior is not, or was not, or will not be, in some of those modes here posited, except when something is prior to another in time, because then it is true to say that the prior

Pro quo sciendum est quod quoddam est prius in quo, et {id}<sup>330</sup> est prius in quo prius tempore est vel fuit [vel erit]<sup>331</sup> quam posterius. Quoddam est prius ex quo, et sic [principia extrinseca rei sunt priora {secundum naturam ipso principiatio secundum naturam}<sup>332</sup>, quia ex eis sit ipsum principiatum, et sic materia et forma ex quibus sit substantia composita sunt priores quam ipsa substantia composita, [et sic]<sup>333</sup> quoddam est prius a quo, et sic]<sup>334</sup> causa effectiva est prior {suo effectu}<sup>335</sup>. Unde principium motus est prior naturaliter effectu qui sit ab ipso. Et quoddam est prius ad quod, et sic finis naturaliter est {prius}<sup>336</sup> his quae sunt ad finem, quia ea quae sunt ad finem ordinantur <ad finem><sup>337</sup> et intenduntur propter finem. Unde finis est prior [in]<sup>338</sup> intentione quam ea quae ordinantur ad finem. Et quoddam est prius in quo, {et sic tempus in quo est prius, est prius alio tempore in quo est posterius. Nam prius tempore est quando posterius tempore est non}<sup>339</sup>. Sic ergo patent quinque modi prioris, quam quaedam est prioritas secundum tempus, et quaedam secundum consequentiam, et

is, or was, or will be in some instance or in some time in which the posterior is not, or was not, or will not be.

For which we need to know that a certain priority is priority in which, and a thing is prior in which it is, or was, or will be, at a time prior to its posterior. A certain priority is priority out of which, and in this way the extrinsic principles of a thing are prior to that of which they are principles by nature, because it is out of these that that thing of which they are principles comes about, and so matter and form from which composite substance comes about are prior to that composite substance. A certain priority is priority from which, and in this way an efficient cause is prior to its effect. Hence the principle of motion is naturally prior to the effect which is from it. A certain priority is priority to which, and in this way ends are naturally prior to those which are for an end, because those which are for an end are ordered and intended according to an end. Hence an end is prior in intention to those which are ordered to that end. And a certain priority is priority in which, and in this way the time in which something prior

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<sup>330</sup> ‘illud’: A, B

<sup>331</sup> B

<sup>332</sup> ‘ipso principiatio secundum naturam secundum naturam’: B

<sup>333</sup> B

<sup>334</sup> A

<sup>335</sup> ‘creato’: B

<sup>336</sup> ‘prior’: B

<sup>337</sup> A

<sup>338</sup> A, B

<sup>339</sup> ‘Et sic species est prius in quo. Prius tempore est quando posterius tempore non est’: A, B

quaedam secundum ordinem doctrinae, et quaedam {secundum honorem}<sup>340</sup>, et quaedam est prioritas secundum naturam, et talis est triplex: {a quo, ex quo et ad quod}<sup>341</sup>.

Et sciendum <est><sup>342</sup> quod in divinis una persona {dicitur}<sup>343</sup> prior alia, et haec prioritas dicitur prioritas originis, {quae prioritas est quando aliquid dicitur sic prius, quia est illud ex quo est alius, quia pater in divinis est prior filio}<sup>344</sup>, et illud quod sic est prius non est prius in quo, nec huic prioritati correspondet aliquid prius in quo, sed solum est ibi prius a quo, [vel ex quo]<sup>345</sup>.

Circa {istam partem}<sup>346</sup> dubitatur an omnis propositio convertatur cum <una><sup>347</sup> propositione in qua verum

exists, is prior to another time in which something posterior exists. For a prior time is when a posterior time does not exist. Therefore, in this way the five modes of priority are clear, as a certain kind is priority according to time, and a certain kind is priority according to consequence, and a certain kind is priority according to the order of teaching, and a certain kind is according to honor, and a certain kind is priority according to nature, and priority of this sort is of three kinds: from which, out of which, and to which.

And we need to understand that in the divine being one person is prior to another, and this priority is called priority of origin. Priority of this sort is when something is prior because it is that out of which another exists. For in the divine being the father is prior to the son, and that which is prior in this way is not prior in which, nor to this priority does there correspond something prior in which, but in this case it can only be prior from which.

Concerning this part, it is unclear whether every statement is convertible with a statement in which ‘true’ is affirmed

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<sup>340</sup> ‘est prioritas secundum honorem’: A

<sup>341</sup> ‘scilicet, ex quo, a quo, ad quod’: A, B

<sup>342</sup> B

<sup>343</sup> ‘est’: B

<sup>344</sup> ‘qua aliud dicitur prius, quia illud est ex quo est aliud, quomodo patrem in divinis est prius filio’: A; ‘qua aliud dicitur prior quae est illud cum quo est aliud, quoniam pater in divinis est prior filio’: B

<sup>345</sup> A

<sup>346</sup> ‘istud’: A

<sup>347</sup> A



affirmatur de illa propositione. Et videtur quam non, [quia]<sup>348</sup> non sequitur, ‘haec est vera, ‘homo est asinus’, ergo homo est asinus’, quia antecedens est possibile, [et]<sup>349</sup> consequens impossibile. Possibilitas ante<g6va>cedentis patet, quia <haec propositio, ‘homo est asinus’, potest significare idem quod haec propositio, ‘deus est bonus’, quia><sup>350</sup> haec vox, ‘homo’, potest [imponi ad]<sup>351</sup> significandum idem quod hoc nomen, ‘deus’, [significat]<sup>352</sup>, et haec vox, ‘asinus’, potest significare idem haec vox, ‘bonus’, ergo haec potest esse vera, ‘homo est asinus’, sicut haec modo est vera, ‘deus est bonus’. {Impossible}<sup>353</sup> ergo quod haec sit vera, ‘homo est asinus’, et tamen haec est {possible}<sup>354</sup>, homo est asinus. <Ergo haec consequentia non verum, ‘haec est verum, ‘homo est asinus’, ergo homo est asinus’><sup>355</sup> Et sic propositio in qua verum affirmatur in aliqua propositione non convertitur cum illa propositione {cum}<sup>356</sup> non infert illam.

Item videtur quod non omnis propositio inferat propositionem in qua ‘verum’ {infertur vel affirmatur}<sup>357</sup> de illa propositione, quia non sequitur, ‘deus est, ergo haec est vera, ‘deus est’, quia possibile est quod haec propositio non sit in rerum natura.

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<sup>348</sup> A; ‘nam’: B

<sup>349</sup> A

<sup>350</sup> A

<sup>351</sup> A

<sup>352</sup> B

<sup>353</sup> ‘possibile’: A, B

<sup>354</sup> ‘impossibile’: A, B

<sup>355</sup> A

<sup>356</sup> ‘quia’: B

<sup>357</sup> ‘enunciatur’: A, B

of that statement. It does not seem so, because this does not follow: ‘‘A human is an ass’ is true, therefore a human is an ass’, because the antecedent is possible and the consequent is impossible. The possibility of the antecedent is clear, because this utterance, ‘human’, can be made to signify the same thing which the name ‘God’ signifies, and this utterance, ‘ass’, can signify the same thing that this utterance, ‘good’, signifies. Therefore, this can be true, ‘A human is an ass’, in just the way that this is true, ‘God is good’. Therefore, it is possible that this is true, ‘A human is an ass’. Yet it is impossible that a human is an ass. Therefore this consequence does not hold: ‘This is true, ‘A human is an ass’, therefore a human is an ass’, and so a statement in which ‘true’ is affirmed of some statement is not convertible with that statement, because it does not infer it.

Likewise, it seems that not every statement infers a statement in which ‘true’ is predicated of that statement, because this does not follow: ‘God is, therefore this is true: ‘God is’, because it is possible that this statement, ‘God is’,

Isto posito adhuc deus est, et tamen haec est non vera, ‘deus est’, quia illud quod non est, non est verum nec falsum.

Item non sequitur, ‘nulla propositio est, ergo haec est vera, ‘nulla propositio est’’, quia aliquid sequitur ad consequens quod non sequitur ad antecedens. [Nam]<sup>358</sup> haec est vera, ‘nulla propositio est’, ergo aliqua propositio est, quia antecedens est possibile, et nullum possibile infert suum proprie contradictorium.

In oppositum est philosophus, <hic><sup>359</sup> dicens quod esse <namque><sup>360</sup> hominem convertitur secundum <essentiae><sup>361</sup> consequentiam ad veram {de se}<sup>362</sup> orationem. Nam si homo est, vera est oratio [in]<sup>363</sup> qua dicitur quod homo est, {et verum est ita esse}<sup>364</sup>.

Ad istud dubium dicunt moderni, expresse contradicentes Aristoteli, quod non est necesse propositionem converti cum propositione in qua ‘verum’ {verificatur}<sup>365</sup> de {ipso}<sup>366</sup> vel de

does not exist. Having said that, it is still the case that God exists, and yet this is not true, ‘God is’, because that which does not exist, is neither true nor false.

Likewise, this does not follow: ‘No statement exists, therefore this is true: ‘No statement exists’’, because something follows from the consequent that does not follow from the antecedent. For this is true, ‘No statement exists’, therefore some statement exists, because the antecedent is possible, and nothing possible infers its own proper contradictory.

In opposition is Aristotle, who say that being a human is converted according to consequence to a true sentence about itself. For if a human exists, the sentence is true in which it is said that a human exists, and if a sentence which states that a human exists, is true, it is the case that a human exists.

To that doubt, the *moderni*, expressly contradicting Aristotle, say that it is not necessary that a statement is converted with a statement in which ‘true’ is predicated of

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<sup>358</sup> A

<sup>359</sup> A, B

<sup>360</sup> A

<sup>361</sup> B

<sup>362</sup> ‘esse’: B

<sup>363</sup> A, B

<sup>364</sup> ‘et si vera est oratio qua dicit quod homo est, verum est etiam in esse’: A

<sup>365</sup> ‘enunciatur’: A, B

<sup>366</sup> ‘seipsam’: A

suo dicto. Unde dicunt quod non sequitur <consequentia><sup>367</sup> ‘homo est, ergo haec est vera, ‘homo est’’, quia posito quod homo sit, et ista propositio, ‘homo est’, non {existat}<sup>368</sup>, tunc consequens est falsum et antecedens non [est falsum]<sup>369</sup>. Falsitas consequentis patet, quia quod non est, non est verum nec falsum. Ista tamen consequentia secundum eos est bona, ‘homo est, ergo ita est quod homo est [in re]<sup>370</sup>’, sed ex hoc non sequitur quod haec sit vera, ‘homo est’.

Haec {opinio}<sup>371</sup> {fundatur super hoc}<sup>372</sup>, quod nulla propositio est vera nisi quando existit <actualiter><sup>373</sup>. Sed quia haec opinio est expresse contra Aristotelem, arguo contra eam, et primo contra fundamentum [<falsum><sup>374</sup> super]<sup>375</sup> quo fundatur. Et proba quod propositio est vera quando non existit actu. <Et><sup>376</sup> Probo sic. Haec consequentia est bona, ‘aliqua propositio est falsa, ergo sua contradictoria est vera’, sed possibile est quod una propositio {est}<sup>377</sup> falsa quando sua contradictoria non existit. Ergo si sequitur aliqua propositio est

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<sup>367</sup> A

<sup>368</sup> ‘sit’: A

<sup>369</sup> A

<sup>370</sup> A

<sup>371</sup> ‘positio’: A

<sup>372</sup> ‘in hoc fundatur’: B

<sup>373</sup> A

<sup>374</sup> B

<sup>375</sup> A

<sup>376</sup> A, B

<sup>377</sup> ‘sit’: A

it or of its *dictum*. Hence they say that this does not follow, ‘A human exists, there this is true, ‘A human exists’’, because, given the claim that a human exists, and this statement, ‘A human exists’, does not exist, the consequence is false and the antecedent is not false. The falsity of the consequent is clear, because that which does not exist, is neither true nor false. However, this consequence is good according to them: ‘A human exists, therefore it is the case that there is a human in reality’, but from this it does not follow that this is true, ‘A human exists’.

This position is founded on this principle, that no statement is true when it does not exist. But because this opinion expressly contradicts Aristotle, I argue against it, and first against the principle which that position assumes. And so I prove that a statement is true when it does not actually exist in this way. This consequence is good, ‘Some statement is false, therefore its contradictory is true’. But it is possible that one statement is false when its contradictory does not exist. Therefore if it follows that some statement is false,

falsa, ergo sua contradictoria est vera, [ergo]<sup>378</sup> propositio potest esse vera quando non existit. Quod autem {haec}<sup>379</sup> consequentia, ‘aliqua propositio est falsa, ergo sua contradictoria est vera’, sit bona, patet per philosophum quinque *Metaphysica*.

Item, probatur consequentia praedicta <sic><sup>380</sup>. Si aliqua propositio est falsa, [ipsa]<sup>381</sup> habet contradictorium, et si [aliqua]<sup>382</sup> propositio est falsa, non habet falsam contradictorium, quia sic contradictoria essent simul falsa, quod est impossibile. Ergo si aliqua propositio est falsa, habet contradictorium verum, et per consequens, si aliqua sit falsa, {suum contradictorium est verum}<sup>383</sup>.

Et si dicatur quod non sequitur, ‘si aliqua propositio est falsa, ergo habet contradictorium, {{quam}<sup>384</sup> suum contradictorium non existit}<sup>385</sup>. Contra, secundum hoc non posset aliquis {reduci ad contradictionem, alias ad redargutionem}<sup>386</sup>, quia si [primo]<sup>387</sup> concedat istam, ‘omnium oppositorum eadem

therefore its contradictory is true. Therefore a statement can be true when it does not exist. But that this consequence – ‘Some statement is false, therefore its contradictory is true’ – is good, is clear from what Aristotle says in *Metaphysics* 5.

Likewise, the consequence previously mentioned is proved in this way. If some statement is false, it has a contradictory, and if some statement is false, it does not have a false contradictory, because otherwise contradictories would be false at the same time, which is impossible. Therefore, if some statement is false, it has a true contradictory, and consequently if some statement is false, its contradictory is true.

And if it is said that it does not follow, ‘If some statement is false, therefore it has a contradictory’, because it does not have a contradictory when its own contradictory does not exist. On the contrary, according to this someone could never be forced into a *reductio ad absurdum*, because if he

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<sup>378</sup> A, B

<sup>379</sup> ‘ista’: A

<sup>380</sup> A, B

<sup>381</sup> B

<sup>382</sup> A

<sup>383</sup> ‘habet suum contradictorium verum’: B

<sup>384</sup> ‘quia’: A

<sup>385</sup> ‘quia non habet contradictorium non quando suum contradictorium existit’: B

<sup>386</sup> ‘reduci ad argumentum’: A; ‘male respondere nec esse sibi conclusum’: B

<sup>387</sup> A

{est}<sup>388</sup> disciplina’, {et postea concedat suum contradictorium}<sup>389</sup> [ipse]<sup>390</sup> non concederet contradictoria, quia ponamus quod quando affirmativa existit quod negativa non existat, et {econtra}<sup>391</sup>. Isto posito {ille}<sup>392</sup> non concessit contradictoria, quia {illa}<sup>393</sup> quae concessit numquam fuerunt contradictoria, {quia nec affirmativa habuit esse quando negativa habuit esse, nec econverso}<sup>394</sup>, quia quodcumque una illarum habuit esse, reliqua non habuit esse, et ita numquam fuerunt contradictoria, et ita non posset aliquis reargui.

Item, haec {responsio}<sup>395</sup> tollit omnem disputationem, quia secundum istam {responsionem}<sup>396</sup> numquam posset respondens respondere ad propositiones propositas ab opponente, quia aut respondebit quando opponens proponit aut prius aut postquam {proposuit opponens}<sup>397</sup>. Non quando opponens {proposuit}<sup>398</sup>, quia tunc opponens et respondens deberent [simul]<sup>399</sup> loqui semper, quod <est><sup>400</sup> inconueniens

first concedes this, ‘Of all opposites the subject matter is the same’, and later he concedes the opposite, he would not concede contradictories, because we stipulated that when an affirmative statement exists, that its negative does not, and conversely. Given that position, he will not concede contradictories, because neither will an affirmative statement have being when a negative has being, nor conversely, because whenever one of those has being, the other will not have being, and so there will never be contradictories, and so no one could be refuted.

Again, this response destroys all disputation, because according to that response a respondent could never respond to a statement proposed by an opponent, since he will respond either while the opponent proposes the statement, or before the opponent has proposed it, or after. He will not respond while the opponent is proposing the statement, because then the opponent and the respondent

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<sup>388</sup> ‘erit’: B

<sup>389</sup> B

<sup>390</sup> A

<sup>391</sup> ‘quando negativa existit, affirmativa non existat’: A

<sup>392</sup> ‘et priusmodum concederet unam contradicentem sibi’: A; ‘istae’: B

<sup>393</sup> ‘ista’: B

<sup>394</sup> ‘nec quando affirmativa habuit esse, nec quando negativa habuit esse’: A

<sup>395</sup> ‘ratio’: A

<sup>396</sup> ‘rationem’: A

<sup>397</sup> ‘proposuerit proponens’: A

<sup>398</sup> ‘proponit’: A

<sup>399</sup> A

<sup>400</sup> B

valde, quamvis sic dicentes ita se habeant de facto, [quia]<sup>401</sup> semper garrulant simul. Nec {oportet}<sup>402</sup> respondere ad dictum opponentis priusquam {proposuerit}<sup>403</sup>, quia sic nesciret ad {quod}<sup>404</sup> {responderet}<sup>405</sup>, quia sic nescit quid opponens intendat proponere, nec {habet}<sup>406</sup> respondere postquam opponens proposuerit, quia postquam {proposuerit}<sup>407</sup> propositio prolata ab opponente non existit, et per consequens non est vera nec falsa, et sic respondens numquam haberet respondere ad propositionem veram {nec}<sup>408</sup> falsam. Et si dicatur quod respondens {oportet}<sup>409</sup> respondere ad unam propositionem quam concipit per dictum {opponentis et non ad dictum opponentis}<sup>410</sup>. Contra, ista propositio quam concipit non est in intellectu respondentis, quia [si]<sup>411</sup> sic, respondens responderet ad suas propositiones et non [ad <g6vb> propositiones]<sup>412</sup> opponentis, et similiter secundum hoc intellectus opponentis et intellectus respondentis non ferrentur ad idem.

would need to speak at the same time all at once, which is exceedingly problematic (although those who defend this view [i.e., the *moderni*] conduct their own arguments in this way, because they are always pointlessly rambling on at the same time). Nor is it necessary to respond to the *dictum* of the opponent before he has proposed it, because in the case the respondent would not know what he is responding to, because he does not know what the opponent intends to propose. Nor does he have to respond after the opponent has proposed it, because after the statement spoken by the opponent is proposed, it does not exist, and consequently is neither true nor false. And in this way a respondent would never have to respond to a true or false statement. And if it is said that the respondent needs to respond to a statement which he conceives through the *dictum* of the opponent, and not to the *dictum* of the opponent itself. On the contrary, that statement which he conceives is not in the intellect of the respondent, because, if it were, the respondent would respond to his own statement and not to the statement of the opponent. Likewise according to this

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<sup>401</sup> B

<sup>402</sup> ‘debet’: A

<sup>403</sup> ‘opposuerit’: A

<sup>404</sup> ‘quid’: A

<sup>405</sup> ‘deberet respondere’: A, B

<sup>406</sup> ‘debet’: A

<sup>407</sup> ‘propositio fuit’: A

<sup>408</sup> ‘vel’: A

<sup>409</sup> ‘debet’: A

<sup>410</sup> ‘opponentem’: B

<sup>411</sup> A

<sup>412</sup> B

Item, si propositio non esset vera <vel falsa><sup>413</sup> nisi quando existit, omnes istae regulae essent falsae – ‘antecedens est verum, ergo et consequens’, ‘consequens est {verum}<sup>414</sup>, ergo et antecedens’ – quia antecedens potest esse verum quando consequens non existit, [et sic {consequens}<sup>415</sup> potest esse verum quando {antecedens}<sup>416</sup> non esset verum, et consequens potest esse falsum quando antecedens non existit]<sup>417</sup>, [et e converso]<sup>418</sup>.

Item {sequitur}<sup>419</sup> quod nullus posset proferre unam conditionalem [veram]<sup>420</sup>, quia quando antecedens est in proferri, tunc consequens non est in proferri, et per consequens tunc consequens non est, et quando non est, tunc non sequitur ex aliquo. Ergo quando antecedens profertur, tunc consequentia non valet, quia tunc consequens non sequitur ex antecedente, nec est conditionalis vera, [et similiter]<sup>421</sup> quando consequens profertur, <quia><sup>422</sup> tunc antecedens non profertur,

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<sup>413</sup> B

<sup>414</sup> ‘falsum’: A

<sup>415</sup> ‘antecedens’: A

<sup>416</sup> ‘consequens’: A

<sup>417</sup> B

<sup>418</sup> A

<sup>419</sup> ‘sequeretur’: B

<sup>420</sup> A

<sup>421</sup> A

<sup>422</sup> A

position, the intellect of the opponent and the intellect of the respondent would not be directed at the same thing.

Again, if a statement is not true except when it exists, all these rules would be false – ‘The antecedent is true, therefore also the consequent’, ‘The consequent is false, therefore also the antecedent’ – because an antecedent can be true when the consequent does not exist, and the consequent can be false when the antecedent does not exist.

Likewise, it follows that no one would be able to express a true conditional, because when the antecedent is being uttered, then the consequent is not being uttered, and consequently then the consequent does not exist, and when it does not exist, then it does not follow from the other. Therefore when the antecedent is uttered, then the consequence does not hold, because then the consequent does not follow from the antecedent, nor is the conditional

et per consequens tunc antecedens non existit, [et]<sup>423</sup> ex eo <enim><sup>424</sup> quod non existit non sequitur [ex]<sup>425</sup> aliquid. Ergo quando consequens profertur, tunc conditionalis non est vera, et per idem patet quod nulla conditionalis in {probatione}<sup>426</sup> {esset}<sup>427</sup> vera. Item, probo hanc consequentiam <aliter><sup>428</sup>, ‘homo est, ergo haec est vera, ‘homo est’’, {quia}<sup>429</sup> antedens nunquam potest esse verum sine consequente. <Nunquam nam potest haec esse vera, ‘homo est’, nisi haec sit vera, ‘homo est, haec est vera, ‘homo est’><sup>430</sup>.

Item, de hoc quod dicunt quod haec consequentia est bona, ‘homo est, ergo ita est in re quod homo est’, quaero de {consequente}<sup>431</sup> huius {consequentiae}<sup>432</sup>, cum sit propositio categorica, quid est ibi subiectum vel quid est ibi praedicatum? {Non potest dici nisi quod istud, scilicet quod ‘homo est’ sit subiectum, et {‘ita est in re’ est praedicatum}<sup>433</sup>, et tunc idem est dicere ‘{ita}<sup>434</sup> est in re quod homo est’, et

true, and likewise when the consequent is uttered, then the antecedent is not uttered, and consequently then the antecedent does not exist, and from the fact that it does not exist, nothing follows from it. Therefore when the consequent is uttered, then the conditional is not true, and through the same reasoning it is clear that no conditional in a proof is true. Likewise, I prove this consequence, ‘A human exists, therefore this is true, ‘A human exists’’, because the antecedent can never be true without the consequent. For this can never be true, ‘A human exists’, unless this is true, ‘A human exists, therefore this is true, ‘A human exists’.

Likewise, from the fact that they say that this consequence is good, ‘A human exists, therefore so it is in reality, that a human exists’, I ask: what is its subject and what is its predicate of the consequent of this consequence (since it is a categorical statement)? Nothing except this can be said, namely that ‘human exists’ is the subject, and ‘so it is in reality’ is the predicate, and then it is the same thing to say

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<sup>423</sup> B

<sup>424</sup> B

<sup>425</sup> A

<sup>426</sup> ‘prolatione’: A, B

<sup>427</sup> ‘est’: A

<sup>428</sup> A

<sup>429</sup> ‘quam’: B

<sup>430</sup> A

<sup>431</sup> ‘existentia’: B

<sup>432</sup> ‘conditionalis’: B

<sup>433</sup> ‘illud praedicatum, scilicet ‘ita est in re’’: A

<sup>434</sup> ‘idem’: A



dicere ‘verum est quod homo est’<sup>435</sup>, quia Aristoteles, ut patet hic in textu, pro eodem habet esse verum et esse ita in re. Ergo, si sequitur, ‘homo est, ergo ita est in re quod homo est’, <ergo><sup>436</sup> sequitur eodem modo, ‘homo est, ergo verum est quod homo est’.

{Propter hoc et}<sup>437</sup> maxime propter dictum Aristotelis et <propter><sup>438</sup> reverentiam antiquorum patrum, dico quod <omnis><sup>439</sup> propositio convertitur cum <una><sup>440</sup> propositione in qua verum enunciatur de illa propositione sicut dicit [hic]<sup>441</sup> Aristoteles, cuius rationem est quia {si propositio asserit ita esse sicut propositio significat, sequitur propositionem esse veram. Nam omnis propositio vera asserit se esse veram, et omnis propositio ponit seipsam esse veram}<sup>442</sup>.

Et si dicatur quod ista non sunt idem {propositionem esse veram and etiam ita esse sicut propositio significat}<sup>443</sup>. Contra,

‘So it is in reality that a human exists’ and to say ‘It is true that a human exists’, because Aristotle, as is clear here in this text, has ‘being true’ and ‘being so in reality’ for the same thing. Therefore, if it follows, ‘A human exists, therefore so it is in reality that a human exists’, it follows in the same way, ‘A human exists, therefore it is true that a human exists’.

Therefore especially because of the *dictum* of Aristotle and because of my respect for the ancients, I say that a statement is converted with a statement in which ‘true’ is said of that statement, just as Aristotle says here, whose reason is that because a statement asserts it to be so in reality, so too the statement signifies a statement to be true, and therefore every statement asserts itself to be true.

And if it is said that these are not the same, that a statement is true and also that so it is in reality just as the statement

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<sup>435</sup> ‘ita est in re quod homo est, et verum est dicere quod homo est’: B

<sup>436</sup> A

<sup>437</sup> ‘ideo’: A

<sup>438</sup> A, B

<sup>439</sup> A

<sup>440</sup> A

<sup>441</sup> B

<sup>442</sup> ‘propositio asserit ita esse in re sicut propositio significat eam propositionem veram, et ideo omnis propositio asserit se ipsam esse veram et ideo omnis propositio ponit seipsam esse veram’: A; ‘propositio asserit ita esse in re sicut propositio significat propositionem esse veram, et ideo omnis propositio asserit se ipsam esse veram’: B

<sup>443</sup> ‘scilicet propositionem esse veram et ita esse in re sicut propositio significat’: A; ‘scilicet esse ita in re sicut propositionem significat et propositionem esse veram’: B;

{sic dictum arguitur}<sup>444</sup>, ita est in re quod homo est, haec est una propositio vera. Quero tunc quid est subiectum in ista. Aut {hoc}<sup>445</sup> quod dico, scilicet ‘homo est’, aut hoc quod dico, ‘ita est in re’. Si dicitur primum, tunc haec conditionalis est vera, ‘si verum est quod homo est, ita est in re [quod homo est]<sup>446</sup>’. Sed posito quod haec propositio non existat, [scilicet]<sup>447</sup> ‘homo est’, de ipsa non affirmatur vere hoc, [scilicet]<sup>448</sup> quod ita est in re, quia eadem ratione posset verum affirmari pro ipsa. Et quicquid potest argui contra istam {quod homo est ita est in re, in hac propositione ‘ita est in re’ vere praedicatur de propositione non existente, sic ‘esse verum’ est praedicatur de propositione non existente}<sup>449</sup>.

Si detur {quod ita est in re quod homo est, si dicis ‘quod homo est’ est ex parte praedicati}<sup>450</sup>. {Contra}<sup>451</sup>, in {sua}<sup>452</sup> conversa erit ex parte subiecti, et erit ista propositio vera, ‘quod homo est, ita est in re’, et sic de propositione non

signifies. On the contrary, having said ‘So in reality that a human exists’, this is a true statement. I ask then what is the subject in it. Either it is this, ‘Human exists’, or this, ‘so it is in reality’. If the first is said to be the subject, then this conditional is true, ‘If it is true that a human exists, it is in reality that a human exists’. But given that this statement does not exist, namely ‘A human exists’, this is not truly affirmed of it, namely ‘so it is in reality’, because by the same account ‘true’ could be affirmed of it. And whatever can be argued against this, that a human exists is true’, can also be argued against this, that a human exists is so in reality. Therefore, just as ‘so it is in reality’ can be truly predicated of a statement which does not exist, so too ‘being true’ is predicated of a statement which does not exist.

If it is denied that in ‘It is so in reality that a human exists’, that which I say, ‘that a human exists’ is part of the predicate. On the contrary, in its converse it will be part of the subject, and this statement, ‘That a human exists, is so

<sup>444</sup> ‘sic dicto’: A; ‘si dico’: B

<sup>445</sup> ‘quod huius modi’: B

<sup>446</sup> A

<sup>447</sup> A, B

<sup>448</sup> A, B

<sup>449</sup> ‘quod ‘homo est, est vera’, potest etiam argui contra illam, quod ‘homo est, ita est in re’, ergo sicut ‘ita est in re’ vere praedicatur de propositione non existente, sic ‘esse verum’ praedicatur de propositione non existente’: A; ‘homo est’, est vera’, potest etiam argui contra illam, ‘‘homo est’, ita est in re’, quia nihil vere praedicatur de propositione non existente’: B

<sup>450</sup> ‘quod in ‘ita est in re quod homo est’, hoc quod dico, ‘quod homo est’, est ex parte praedicati’: A; ‘secundum, scilicet quod hoc quod dico, quod homo est, sit praedicatum’: B

<sup>451</sup> ‘tunc’: A, B

<sup>452</sup> ‘una’: B

existente affirmatur aliquid, scilicet ‘ita est in re’, et eodem modo potest verum <vere><sup>453</sup> affirmari de propositione [non]<sup>454</sup> existente.

Item probo hanc conditionalem, ‘si homo est, haec propositio, ‘homo est’, est vera’, quia haec est quaedam conditionalis, ergo habet antecedens et consequens et nihil est antecedens nisi propositio, et quicquid sequitur ex antecedente et consequente sequitur ex antecedente per se. Sed [ex antecedente per se]<sup>455</sup> sequitur ‘homo est’, et ‘homo est’ est propositio. Ergo ‘homo est’ non est propositio falsa. [Modo ergo ex istis tribus sequitur quod ‘homo est’ est vera propositio. Sequitur enim ‘homo est’, et ‘homo est’ est propositio, et non est propositio falsa]<sup>456</sup>. [Ergo est propositio vera, [et quicquid sequitur ex antecedente et suis consequentibus sequitur ex antecedente per se]<sup>457</sup>. Ergo sequitur ‘homo est’]<sup>458</sup>, ergo ‘homo est’ est propositio vera’.

in reality’ will be true, and so something is affirmed of a statement which does not exist, namely ‘is so in reality’, and in the same way ‘true’ can truly be affirmed of a statement which does not exist.

Likewise, I prove this conditional: ‘If a human exists, this statement, ‘A human exists’, is true’, because this is a certain conditional, therefore it has an antecedent and a consequent and nothing is an antecedent except a statement, and whatever follows from the antecedent and the consequent follows from the antecedent *per se*. But ‘A human exists’ follows from it, and ‘A human exists’ is a statement. Therefore, ‘A human exists’ is not a false statement. Therefore, in this way, from these three, it follows that ‘A human exists’ is a true statement. For ‘A human exists’ follows, and ‘A human exists’ is a statement, and it is not a false statement. Therefore it is a true statement, and whatever follows from an antecedent and its consequent follows from the antecedent *per se*. Therefore it follows, ‘A human exists, therefore ‘A human exists’ is a true statement’.

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<sup>453</sup> A, B

<sup>454</sup> A

<sup>455</sup> A, B

<sup>456</sup> A

<sup>457</sup> A

<sup>458</sup> B

[Sed]<sup>459</sup> si negatur ista conditionalis, <scilicet><sup>460</sup> ‘si homo est, ‘homo est’ est propositio [vera]<sup>461</sup>. Conta, ista conditionalis non potest esse falsa, quia si ista conditionalis sit falsa, tunc consequens huius conditionalis est {vera}<sup>462</sup>. Ergo conditionalis est vera ut nunc, quia ut nunc verum sequitur ad quodlibet, et sic conditionalis nunquam potest esse falsa, quia si detur quod in aliquo nunc sit falsa, sequitur quod in eodem nunc sit vera. Probatio {maioris}<sup>463</sup>: quia si haec conditionalis sit falsa, tunc {habet}<sup>464</sup> antecedens ad quod non sequitur consequens. Sed nihil est antecedens <in se><sup>465</sup> nisi sit propositio. Ergo si conditionalis {est}<sup>466</sup> falsa, {tunc consequens}<sup>467</sup> conditionalis est propositio, et per consequens si haec conditionalis sit falsa, ‘si homo est, ‘homo est’ est propositio’, sequitur quod <g7ra> homo est, {quia suum antecedens est propositio}<sup>468</sup>. Ergo si {praedicta}<sup>469</sup> conditionalis {est}<sup>470</sup> falsa, sequitur quod consequens conditionalis sit verum, vel saltem sequitur quod ita est in re sicut consequens significat, et per consequens consequentia est bona. Dico ergo quod haec consequentia est bona, ‘homo est,

But if this conditional is denied: ‘If a human exists, ‘A human exists’ is a true statement’. On the contrary, that conditional cannot be false, because if that conditional is false, then the consequent of this conditional is true. Therefore the conditional is true *ut nunc*, because something true *ut nunc* follows from everything, and so the conditional can never be false, because if it is conceded that in some *nunc* it would be false, it follows that in the same *nunc* it would be true. Proof of the major: because if this conditional were false, then it has an antecedent from which the consequent does not follow. But nothing is an antecedent unless it is a statement. Therefore if the conditional is false, then the consequent of the conditional is a statement, and consequently if this conditional, ‘If a human exists, ‘A human exists’ is a statement’, is false, it follows that a human exists, because its antecedent is a statement. Therefore if the previously mentioned conditional is false, it follows that the consequent of the conditional is true, or at least it follows that it is so in

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<sup>459</sup> A

<sup>460</sup> A

<sup>461</sup> A

<sup>462</sup> ‘veram’: A

<sup>463</sup> ‘primae consequentiae, scilicet si haec conditionalis sit falsa, consequens est veram’: A; ‘primae consequentiae, scilicet si haec conditionalis est falsa, consequens est vera’: B

<sup>464</sup> ‘haberet’: A

<sup>465</sup> B

<sup>466</sup> ‘sit’: A

<sup>467</sup> ‘antecedens’: A

<sup>468</sup> ‘quam est suum antecedens esse propositionem’: B

<sup>469</sup> ‘dicta’: B

<sup>470</sup> ‘sit’: A

ergo haec est vera, ‘homo est’’, sicut Aristoteles dicit <et aliquo><sup>471</sup>.

Ad primum in contrarium, dico quod haec consequentia est bona, ‘haec est vera, ‘homo est asinus’, ergo homo est asinus’, et antecedens est impossibile sicut consequens demonstrando istam, ‘homo est asinus’, [in]<sup>472</sup> terminis sic significantibus sicut modo significant apud nos. Et quando dicitur quod isti termini possunt significare alia, scilicet deum et bonum, dico quod si istae voces imponantur ad significandum alia, [illa]<sup>473</sup> erit alia propositio quam modo est, quia propositio habet identitatem suam vel diversitatem ab identitate vel diversitate significatorum per terminos propositionis, quod patet per Aristotelem, primo *Perihermeneias*, qui dicit quod si ‘tunica’ imponatur ad significandum hominem et equum, ista oratio, ‘tunica est alba’, non est una oratio in una significatione et in alia, sed plures sunt orationes. Una quae significat quod homo est albus, et alia quae significat quod equus est albus. Et [ex]<sup>474</sup> hoc arguo non minus est oratio diversa ex diversitate significatorum in diversis temporibus quam ex diversitate significatorum in eodem tempore, quia causa diversitatis semper manet eadem, scilicet diversitas significatorum. Cum ergo isti termini, ‘homo’ et ‘asinus’, non significant idem in

reality just as the consequent signifies, and consequently the consequence is good. Therefore I say that this consequence is good, ‘A human exists, therefore this is true, ‘A human exists’’, just as Aristotle says.

To the first argument to the contrary, I say that this consequence is good, ‘This is true, ‘A human is an ass’’, therefore a human is an ass’, and the antecedent is impossible just as the consequent, by using this statement, ‘A human is an ass’, with the terms signifying in just the way they signify with us. And when it is said that those terms can signify other things, namely God and something good, I say that if those utterances are made to signify other things, then it will be a different statement than it is when the terms signify as they do for us now, because a statement has its identity or diversity from the identity or diversity of the things signified through the terms of the statement. This is clear from Aristotle, who says in the first book of the *Perihermeneias* that if ‘tunic’ is made to signify a human and a horse, this sentence, ‘A tunic is white’, is not one sentence with two different significates, but rather there are two sentences: one which signifies that a human is white, and another which signifies that a horse is white. And from this I argue that no less is a sentence diverse from the diversity of significates at different times than from the

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<sup>471</sup> A, B

<sup>472</sup> A, B

<sup>473</sup> A

<sup>474</sup> A

eodem tempore, sed uterque vel aliter significet multa et diversa, sequitur quod {haec}<sup>475</sup> oratio non est una sed plures. Eodem modo si uterque illorum terminorum vel aliter significet diversa in diversis temporibus, non erit propositio una nec eadem [propositio]<sup>476</sup> nisi materialiter, sed altero <istorum><sup>477</sup> terminorum vel utroque significante diversa in diversis temporibus erit alia et alia propositio in temporibus diversis in quibus unum {significat}<sup>478</sup> in uno tempore, et aliud in alio tempore, quamvis materialiter sint eadem.

Et si dicatur quod voces sunt eadem, et oratio non est nisi vox, ergo oratio est eadem quantumcumque termini significant diversa, dicendum <est><sup>479</sup> quod vox est {materiale}<sup>480</sup> in propositione prolata [et]<sup>481</sup> respectus ad significatum per vocem est formale in propositione, et ideo si significata <in propositione><sup>482</sup> [sint et]<sup>483</sup> {fiant}<sup>484</sup> diversa [respectus ad significata]<sup>485</sup>, erunt diversi <propositiones><sup>486</sup>, et sic non

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<sup>475</sup> 'ista': A

<sup>476</sup> A

<sup>477</sup> 'uterque istorum': A

<sup>478</sup> 'significatur': A

<sup>479</sup> B

<sup>480</sup> 'materialis': A

<sup>481</sup> B

<sup>482</sup> B

<sup>483</sup> B

<sup>484</sup> 'sunt': A

<sup>485</sup> B

diversity of significates at the same time, because the cause of diversity always remains the same, namely the diversity of the significates. Therefore since these terms, 'human' and 'ass', do not signify the same thing at the same time, but both or either signify many and diverse things, it follows that this sentence is not one but many. In the same way, if either or both of those terms signify diverse things at different times, it will not be one and the same statement except materially. For, by either of the terms or by both signifying diverse things at different times, there will be one statement signifying one thing at one time and another statement signifying another statement at another time, although materially they would be the same.

And if it is said that the utterances are the same, and that a sentence is nothing other than an utterance, therefore a sentence is the same, however much the terms signify diverse things, it must be said that an utterance is the material in a spoken statement and the *respectus* to a significate through the utterance is the formal element in a statement, and therefore if the significates are diverse, they

manebit propositio eadem quantum ad suum {formalem}<sup>487</sup>, quamvis maneat eadem quantum ad suum materiale. Et propter hoc {est dicendum}<sup>488</sup> quod haec propositio, ‘homo est asinus’, nunquam potest esse vera demonstrando propositionem in quae iste terminus, ‘homo’, significat animal rationale, [et iste terminus, ‘asinus’, animal irrationale]<sup>489</sup>. Alia tamen propositio in eisdem <vocibus><sup>490</sup> potest esse vera si termini imponantur aliis significatis, ut argutum fuit. Sed illa propositio non est eadem {propositioni}<sup>491</sup> in qua ‘homo’ significat animal rationale, et ‘asinus’ animal irrationale, nisi materialiter, ut dictum est.

Ad aliam rationem, quando probatur quod non sequitur, ‘deus est, ergo haec est vera, ‘deus est’, quia possibile est quod haec propositio, ‘deus est’, non sit, {<et><sup>492</sup> per consequens possibile est quod}<sup>493</sup> non sit vera, dicendum quod haec consequentia est bona, ‘deus est, ergo haec est vera, [‘deus est’]<sup>494</sup>’. Et dico quod non sequitur, ‘haec propositio non est, ergo non est vera’, quia propositionem esse veram non est

will be diverse statements, and so the statement will not remain the same with respect to its formal element, although it remains the same with respect to its material elements. And on account of this it must be said that this statement, ‘A human is an ass’, can never be true by indicating a statement in which this term, ‘human’, signifies a rational animal, and this term, ‘ass’, signifies an irrational animal. However, another statement composed of the same utterances can be true if the terms are made to signify different significates, as was argued earlier. But that statement is not the same statement in which ‘human’ signifies a rational animal, and ‘ass’ signifies an irrational animal, except materially, as was said.

To that other reason, when it is proved that it does not follow, ‘God exists, therefore this is true, ‘God exists’’, because it is possible that this statement, ‘God exists’, does not exist, and consequently it is possible that it is not true, it must be said that this consequence is good, ‘God exists, therefore this is true, ‘God exists’’. And I say that this does not follow – ‘This statement does not exist, therefore it is

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<sup>486</sup> A, B

<sup>487</sup> ‘formale’: A

<sup>488</sup> ‘dico’: A

<sup>489</sup> B

<sup>490</sup> A, B

<sup>491</sup> ‘propositio’: A

<sup>492</sup> B

<sup>493</sup> ‘ergo possibile est quod haec propositio, ‘deus est’’: A

<sup>494</sup> A

aliud quam <ipsam><sup>495</sup> significare, vel esse significativam, sicut in re. Sed haec propositio, ‘deus est’, terminis significantibus sicut {nunc}<sup>496</sup> significant, semper significat sicut est <modo><sup>497</sup> in re, sive <haec><sup>498</sup> propositio sit sive non sit. Quod patet, quia si in disputatione opponens proponat ista, ‘deus est’, respondens habet istam concedere, si non obligetur ad oppositum. Sed non concedit istam quando profertur, quia tunc opponens et respondens {similiter habent}<sup>499</sup> loqui, quod non est verum. Et quando non profertur, tunc non est. Ergo, habet concedere [illam]<sup>500</sup> quando non est. Et {non}<sup>501</sup> concedere non obligatur nisi verum. Ergo haec est {verum}<sup>502</sup>, quando non est.

[Et]<sup>503</sup> confirmatur. Nam postquam {ipsa}<sup>504</sup> est prolata, <ipsam><sup>505</sup> est {obiecta}<sup>506</sup> memoriae, quia aliter opponens non haberet nec habere posset memoriam de prolatis a respondente, quod est inconueniens, quia tunc nunquam bene posset respondere. Ergo quando propositio non est, potest esse

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<sup>495</sup> A, B

<sup>496</sup> ‘modo’: A

<sup>497</sup> A

<sup>498</sup> A

<sup>499</sup> ‘simul haberent’: A

<sup>500</sup> A

<sup>501</sup> ‘nihil’: A

<sup>502</sup> ‘vera’: A

<sup>503</sup> B

<sup>504</sup> ‘propositio’: A

<sup>505</sup> A, B

<sup>506</sup> ‘obiectam’: A, B

not true’ – because for a statement to be true is nothing other than for it to signify, or to be significative, just as it is in reality. But this statement, ‘God exists’, its terms signifying just as they do now, always signifies just as it is in reality, whether that statement exists or not. That is clear, because if in a disputation the opponent utters this statement, ‘God exists’, the respondent has to concede it, if he is not obligated to the opposite. But he does not concede it when it is uttered, because then the opponent and respondent would have to speak at the same time, which is not true. And when it is not uttered, then it does not exist. Therefore, he has to concede the statement when it does not exist. And he is not obligated to concede it unless it is true. Therefore, it is true, when it does not exist.

This is confirmed. For after a statement is spoken, it is an object of memory, because otherwise the opponent would not have or be able to have a memory of the statement spoken by the respondent, which is problematic, because then the respondent would never be able to respond well.



{obiecta}<sup>507</sup> memoriae, et per consequens {ipsi intellectui}<sup>508</sup>, et per consequens quando propositio non est, significat aliquid <in><sup>509</sup> intellectui a quo intelligitur. Ergo significat verum aut falsum. Sed haec, ‘deus est’, non significat falsum. Ergo ‘deus est’, quando non, significat verum. Hoc etiam patet, nam bene respondens iudicat [de prolatis]<sup>510</sup> ab opponente postquam sunt prolata, utrum sunt vera vel falsa, et secundum quod iudicat sic respondet. <Propositio><sup>511</sup> ergo {quae}<sup>512</sup> non nisi obiective in intellectu vero iudicio iudicatur esse vera vel falsa, et per consequens est vera vel falsa.

Item illud quod non est potest {aliquid}<sup>513</sup> significare, ut patet, quia multoties illud quod non est apparet sensui vel intellectui, {vel}<sup>514</sup> intellectus {respectu}<sup>515</sup> illius aliquid intelligit, et sic illud quod non est potest aliquid {representare}<sup>516</sup> intellectui, ut patet <in ludisitis (?) et><sup>517</sup>

Therefore, when a statement does not exist, it can be an object of memory, and consequently it can be an object for the intellect, and so when the statement does not exist, it signifies something to the intellect by which it is understood. Therefore, it signifies something true or something false. But this, ‘God exists’, does not signify something false. Therefore, ‘God exists’, when it does not exist, signifies something true. This is also clear, for assume that a respondent judges correctly about the things spoken by an opponent after they are spoken, whether they are true or false, and according to how he judges so he responds. Therefore that which is nothing except objectively in the intellect is judged to be true or false, and consequently is true or false.

Likewise, that which does not exist can signify something, as it clear, because oftentimes that which does not exist appears to one’s senses or intellect, and the intellect through a representation of it thinks about something, and so something which does not exist can be present to the

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<sup>507</sup> ‘obiectam’: A, B

<sup>508</sup> ‘ipsius intellectus’: A, B

<sup>509</sup> A

<sup>510</sup> A

<sup>511</sup> A

<sup>512</sup> ‘quaecumque’: B

<sup>513</sup> ‘aliud’: B

<sup>514</sup> ‘et’: A, B

<sup>515</sup> ‘per repraesentationem’: A; ‘per praesentationem’: B

<sup>516</sup> ‘praesentare’: A

<sup>517</sup> A

[etiam]<sup>518</sup> in somnis in quibus aliquando videtur {somnianti}<sup>519</sup> quod loquatur cum {mortuis}<sup>520</sup>, vel [quod]<sup>521</sup> videt montem aureum, et huiusmodi non entia apparentia intellectui in somno aliquid significant {somnianti}<sup>522</sup>, et tamen non sunt in rerum natura. {Quia ergo propositio quae non existit in rerum natura, existens tamen in intellectu obiective, potest significare verum vel falsum, et per consequens aliquid significare intellectui}<sup>523</sup>. <Et quoniam intelligitur><sup>524</sup>, dico ergo quod propositio quae non est in rerum natura quae tamen {actualiter intellecta}<sup>525</sup> significat {intellectui}<sup>526</sup> verum vel falsum, et per consequens est vera vel falsa, quia propositio non est vera nisi quia est significativa veri.

Intelligendum quod possibile est intellectum intelligere propositionem quae significat deum esse, non intelligendo istam, ‘deus est’, quae fuit prolata a me, nec intelligendo illam quae fuit prolata ab alio, sed intelligendo unum commune abstractum per intellectum a {qualibus}<sup>527</sup> propositione tali vel consimili. Unde licet universale non haberet esse existere extra animam, sicut dicunt moderni, tamen non est dubium quin

intellect. This happens in sleep, where sometimes it seems to someone sleeping that he talks with the dead, or that he sees a golden mountain or other non-beings of this sort, appearing to the intellect in sleep, signify something to the person sleeping, and yet they do not in fact exist. Therefore because a statement which does not in fact exist, though existing in the intellect objectively, can signify something true or something false, and consequently can signify something to the intellect, I say that a statement which does not in fact exist, which yet actually is thought, signifies something true or something false to the intellect, and consequently is true or false, because a statement is not true unless because it is significative of something true.

One must understand that it is possible for the intellect to think of a statement which signifies that God exists, not by thinking this, ‘God exists’, which was spoken by me, or by thinking that which was spoken by you, but by thinking one thing common to both, abstracted by the intellect from each particular statement or a similar one. Hence, even if, just as the *moderni* say, a universal does not have existence

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<sup>518</sup> B

<sup>519</sup> ‘somnolento’: B

<sup>520</sup> ‘mortuo’: A, B

<sup>521</sup> A

<sup>522</sup> ‘somnolento’: B

<sup>523</sup> ‘quare ergo negetur propositio quae non existit in rerum natura non potest aliquid significare intellectui et quomodo intellectur’: A; ‘quare igitur negantur propositio quae non existit in rerum natura aliud significare intellectui’: B

<sup>524</sup> B

<sup>525</sup> ‘est accidentaliter’: B

<sup>526</sup> ‘intentioni’: B

<sup>527</sup> ‘qualibet’: A

secundum {omnes}<sup>528</sup> universale habet esse {obiective}<sup>529</sup> in intellectu. Potest {nam}<sup>530</sup> intellectus intelligere leonem vel elephantem [in universali, non intelligendo istum leonem <animal><sup>531</sup> nec istum elephantem <animal><sup>532</sup>]<sup>533</sup>, et eodem modo potest intellectus intelligere unum commune cuilibet tali propositioni, scilicet huic, ‘deus est’, prolatae a me, et huic, ‘deus est’, prolatae a Socrate, et sic de aliis. Credo quod in {disputatione}<sup>534</sup> opponens et respondens {fuerunt}<sup>535</sup> intellectus suos ad talia communia omnibus propositionibus prolatis de quibus disputant, et {fuerunt}<sup>536</sup> intellectus suos ad idem, et sic {patet}<sup>537</sup> quod respondens potest redargui, quia potest idem concedere et negare <scilicet><sup>538</sup> unum commune multis individuis propositionibus omnino similibus. Eadem tamen propositionem individuum non potest intellectus concedere et negare, quia idem individuum propositionis non potest bis proferri.

Conta hoc – quod dicitur quod propositio, quando non est, est vera vel falsa – potest argui quia si talis propositio quae non

outside the soul, yet there is no doubt but that, according to them, a universal has subjective being in the intellect. For the intellect can think about a lion or an elephant in the universal, not by thinking this lion or this elephant. In the same way the intellect can think one thing common to each such statement, namely this, ‘God exists’, spoken by me, and this, ‘God exists’, spoken by Socrates, and so on for the rest. I believe that in a disputation the opponent and the respondent have directed their intellects to such a thing common to all the spoken statements about which they dispute, and they direct their intellects to the same thing, and so it is clear that a respondent can be refuted, because he is able to concede and to deny one thing common to many individual, completely similar statements. However, the intellect cannot concede and deny the very same particular statement, because the same particular statement cannot be uttered twice.

Against this – that a statement, when it does not exist, is true or false – it can be argued that if such a statement

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<sup>528</sup> ‘eos’: B

<sup>529</sup> ‘subjective’: A, B

<sup>530</sup> ‘enim’: A, B

<sup>531</sup> B

<sup>532</sup> B

<sup>533</sup> A

<sup>534</sup> ‘disputationibus’: A

<sup>535</sup> ‘ferunt’: A, B

<sup>536</sup> ‘ferunt’: A, B

<sup>537</sup> ‘potest salvari’: A

<sup>538</sup> A

est, est vera [vel falsa]<sup>539</sup>, ergo est propositio, et per consequens oratio. Sed omnis oratio est vox, et omnis vox est qualitas. Ergo propositio quae non est, est qualitas, et per consequens propositio quae non est, est. Item veritas propositionis est accidens propositionis, et [omne]<sup>540</sup> accidens est in subiecto existente. Ergo si veritas insit propositioni quae non est, {videtur}<sup>541</sup> quod propositio quae non est, {existat}<sup>542</sup>.

Ad primum, {dico concedendo}<sup>543</sup> quod propositio quae non est, est vera, et potest concedi quod est propositio, et etiam <quod est><sup>544</sup> oratio. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod sit vox, sed {illa}<sup>545</sup> descriptio {orationis}<sup>546</sup>, scilicet **quod oratio est vox significativa**, {et cetera}<sup>547</sup>, datur de oratione {actu}<sup>548</sup> prolata, non autem competit orationi habenti solum esse {obiective}<sup>549</sup> in intellectu, vel potest haec consequentia negari, ‘propositio quae non est, est propositio, ergo est oratio’, quia oratio solum <est><sup>550</sup> genus propositionis prolatae, et non est genus

which does not exist is true or false, therefore it is a statement, and consequently a sentence. But every sentence is an utterance, and every utterance is a quality. Therefore a statement which does not exist, is a quality, and consequently a statement which does not exist, exists. Likewise, the truth of a statement is an accident of the statement, and every accident is in an existing subject. Therefore, if truth is in a statement which does not exist, it seems that a statement which does not exist, exists.

To the first, I respond by conceding that a statement which does not exist is true, and it can be conceded that it is a statement, and even that it is a sentence, but from this it does not follow that it is an utterance. That description of a sentence, namely **that a sentence is a significative utterance**, etc., is said about a sentence actually spoken, but does not apply to a sentence having only objective being in the intellect. Or, alternatively, this consequence can be rejected, ‘A statement which does not exist, is a

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<sup>539</sup> A, B

<sup>540</sup> ‘omnis’: A; B

<sup>541</sup> ‘sequitur’: A

<sup>542</sup> ‘existit’: A

<sup>543</sup> ‘dicendum’: A; ‘dico concedo’: B

<sup>544</sup> A

<sup>545</sup> ‘ista’: A

<sup>546</sup> ‘vocis’: A

<sup>547</sup> ‘tamen’: A

<sup>548</sup> ‘a casu’: A

<sup>549</sup> ‘subiective’: A, B

<sup>550</sup> A

propositionis habentis esse {obiective}<sup>551</sup> [in intellectu tantum]<sup>552</sup>.

Sciendum quod propositio habet esse {quattuor}<sup>553</sup> modis, scilicet in scripto, in prolotione, et <etiam><sup>554</sup> in mente, et {etiam in re}<sup>555</sup>, ut visum est {superius in isto libro}<sup>556</sup>. <Et><sup>557</sup> propositio in mente est duplex, quia quaedam habet esse <solum><sup>558</sup> subiective in mente, et talis propositio componitur ex conceptibus, et quaedam est propositio habens esse {obiective}<sup>559</sup> in intellectu, et huiusmodi propositio componitur solum secundum considerationem intellectus, [et]<sup>560</sup> ex partibus habentibus solum esse obiective in intellectu, sive sint voces praeteritae sive futurae, {et sic de aliis}<sup>561</sup>. Item propositio existens in sola consideratione intellectus significat intellectum verum vel falsum, et hoc est satis intelligibile omni intellectui bene disposito.

Ad aliud cum dicitur veritas propositionis est accidens

statement, therefore it is a sentence', because a sentence is only a genus of a spoken statement, and it is not a genus of a statement having only objective being in the intellect.

We must know that a statement has being in four ways, namely in writing, in speech, and in the mind, and also in reality, as was seen earlier in this book. A statement in the mind is of two kinds, because a certain kind has subjective being in the mind, and a statement of this sort is composed out of concepts, and a certain kind is a statement having objective being in the intellect, and a statement of this sort is composed solely according to the consideration of the intellect, and out of parts having only objective being in the intellect, whether those parts are utterances from the past or from the future, and so on for the rest. Likewise, a statement existing solely in the consideration of the intellect signifies a true or false intellect, and this is intelligible enough to each intellect with a keen disposition.

To the other, when it is said that the truth of a statement is

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<sup>551</sup> 'subiective': A, B

<sup>552</sup> A

<sup>553</sup> 'quinque': B

<sup>554</sup> A

<sup>555</sup> 'quoddam': A

<sup>556</sup> 'in principio illius libri': A

<sup>557</sup> A

<sup>558</sup> B

<sup>559</sup> 'obiectivum': A, B

<sup>560</sup> A

<sup>561</sup> 'sive sunt fines (?) praeteritae sive futurae': A

propositionis, dicendum quod quando propositio existit, tunc veritas propositionis est <actualis><sup>562</sup> accidens eius, sed quando propositio est praeterita [vel]<sup>563</sup> non existens in actu, tunc non est concedendum quod veritas propositionis illius sit accidens, sed quod fuit accidens.

{Sed}<sup>564</sup> si dicatur quod <si><sup>565</sup> *a* sit verum, et sit <*a*><sup>566</sup> propositio quae non est, ergo veritas inest ipsi, *a*, sed accidentis {esse est inesse}<sup>567</sup>, ergo si veritas inest *a*, {ita est}<sup>568</sup> quod illa veritas est, et per consequens suum subiectum est, <est><sup>569</sup> dicendum quod aliquid inesse alicui potest esse dupliciter: vel tanquam praedicatum subiecto de quo praedicatur, vel tanquam accidens subiecto cui inhaeret. Dico tunc quod bene sequitur, ‘*a* est verum, ergo veritas sive verum inest ipsi, *a*, tanquam praedicatum subiecto’. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod illa veritas {quae inest}<sup>570</sup> alicui tanquam praedicatum [subiecto]<sup>571</sup> praesupponat illud esse, {nec}<sup>572</sup> sequitur ‘*a* est verum, ergo veritas inest ipsi, *a*, tanquam accidens subiecto’.

an accident of the statement, it must be said that when a statement exists, then the truth of that statement is an accident of it, but when a statement is in the past and does not exist in actuality, then it must not be conceded that the truth of that statement is an accident of it, but rather that it was an accident.

But if it is said that *a* is true, and it is a statement which does not exist, therefore truth is in this, *a*, but being an accident is being-in, therefore if truth is in *a*, it is the case that that truth exists, and consequently its subject exists, it must be said that something can be in another in two ways: either as a predicate in the subject of which it is predicated, or as an accident in the subject in which it inheres. I say then that this rightly follows, ‘*a* is true, therefore truth or something true is in this, *a*, as a predicate in a subject’. But from this it does not follow that that truth which is in something as a predicate in a subject presupposes that it exists, nor does it follow, ‘*a* is true, therefore truth is in

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<sup>562</sup> B

<sup>563</sup> ‘et’: A

<sup>564</sup> ‘et’: A

<sup>565</sup> A

<sup>566</sup> A

<sup>567</sup> ‘in esse est accidentiter’: A; ‘in esse est accidentaliter’: B

<sup>568</sup> ‘sequitur’: A, B

<sup>569</sup> B

<sup>570</sup> ‘est nec inesse’: A; ‘est sed inesse’: B

<sup>571</sup> B

<sup>572</sup> ‘sed non’: A, B

{Etiam}<sup>573</sup> propter hoc non sequitur, ‘*a* est verum, ergo veritas ipsius, *a*, est’, nec etiam {quod *a* est, et cetera}<sup>574</sup>.

this, *a*, as an accident in a subject’. Also, on account of this, this consequence does not follow, ‘*a* is true, therefore the truth of this, *a*, exists’, nor even that *a* exists, etc.

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<sup>573</sup> ‘et’: A, B

<sup>574</sup> ‘sequitur quod ipsum, *a*, est’: A